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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS IN BUSINESS CYCLES

Ningru Zhao, Ph.D.
Department of Economics
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Carl Campbell III, Director

The purpose of this dissertation is to explain several phenomena in business cycles. The
first chapter serves to introduce the aims and methods of the subsequent chapters. Chapter
2 incorporates empirical methodology and a proposed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with Epstein-Zin preferences and several real rigidities to investigate
and explain the differing effects of surprise and anticipated government spending shocks.
Chapter 3 studies the implication of asset pricing under news-driven business cycles. This
chapter achieves a desirable equity premium and risk-free rate under news-driven business
cycles with a lower relative risk aversion (RRA) and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) slightly larger than one. Chapter 4 addresses aggregate labor market fluctuations
through a proposed family-labor-supply model with efficient leisure in the real business cycle
(RBC) frame to capture the facts of aggregate labor market fluctuations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and explain the following phenomena in
business cycles: First, the effects of government spending shocks; second, asset returns; and,
finally, aggregate labor market fluctuations.
The second chapter adopts a two-step approach to identify the effects of surprise shocks
and anticipated shocks to government spending. After establishing the empirical link, I use a
theoretical model that features Epstein-Zin preferences and several real rigidities to explain
the empirical findings. Currently, two different strands of literature investigate government
spending shocks, structural VAR (SVAR) and expectation-augmented VAR (SVAR); this
existing literature focuses discretely on either surprise government spending shocks or anticipated government spending shocks. My goal is the incorporation of the two strands of
literature into one integrated framework, both for empirical investigation and theoretical
analysis. The empirical work shows that output and labor supply rise while consumption
and investment fall after a positive government spending shock, whether the shock is anticipated or not. My findings differ from those demonstrated in SVAR literature, in which
consumption increases after a positive surprise government spending shock. The theoretical
model exactly replicates the empirical findings and shows the different dynamics between the
effects of surprise government shocks and the effects of anticipated government shocks. By
decreasing current consumption and increasing current labor supply prior to the realization
of the positive government spending shock, the economic agent can obtain a higher consumption level in contrast to the conditions following positive surprise government spending
shocks. In conclusion, this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the effects of sur-
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prise and anticipated government spending shocks.
The third chapter explains asset returns in news-driven business cycles. Although significant literature is devoted to explaining asset returns at business cycle frequency, few studies
reach the goal in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE), the main tool
for investigating business cycles. The discussion of news-driven business cycles is now the
prevailing topic in the literature of business cycles. Therefore, the logical question whether
we can explain asset returns in news-driven business cycles demands to be considered in
the current literature. My third chapter addresses this problem and achieves a desirable
equity premium and risk-free rate under news-driven business cycles in a DSGE model with
reasonable parameters.
The fourth chapter proposes a family-labor-supply model with efficient leisure in the RBC
frame and convincingly interprets the aggregate labor market fluctuations by investigating
two different effects brought by technological shocks. The explanation does not require
other, supplemental shocks such as government spending shocks or home production shocks.
Technological shocks are sufficient to explain the aggregated labor market fluctuations.

CHAPTER 2
GOVERNMENT SPENDING SHOCKS

2.1

Introduction

The effects of government spending shocks on macroeconomic variables is a common
topic frequently discussed in macroeconomics. The discussion of the effects of government
spending shocks, however, has long been dormant since economists have switched to favoring monetary policy as a useful tool to stabilize or stimulate the economy. After the 2008
financial crisis, the renewed awareness of the significance of government spending makes
discussion revived. Government spending, as an aspect of fiscal policy, is much more useful
in stimulating the economy than monetary policy at zero nominal lower bound. Yet, the
effects of both anticipated and surprise government spending shocks are still not clear in the
literature. Therefore, rigorous understanding of the comprehensive effects of anticipated and
surprise shocks is urgent work for economists.
To investigate the effects of anticipated and surprise government spending shocks, I employ a two-step econometric methodology to identify the anticipated shocks and surprise
shocks of government spending. The empirical results of this study show that although
output and labor supply rise, consumption and investment fall after a positive government
spending shock, whether anticipated or not. After establishing the empirical link, I then
propose a neo-classical model featuring Epstein-Zin preferences and several real rigidities to
explain the empirical results. By combining anticipated and surprise government spending
shocks into one study, this paper contributes a comprehensive analysis of government spend-
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ing shocks to the literature of empirical investigations and theoretical models in government
spending shocks.
The prevailing empirical method used to identify government spending shocks is structural VAR (SVAR) as shown in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and a variation of SVAR as
shown in Ramey (2011), which incorporates expectations to estimate the effects of government spending shocks. The literature of SVAR does not take expectations into account.
Therefore, the shocks identified in SVAR are often surprise shocks. Government spending
shocks identified in the literature that does incorporate expectations are customary anticipated shocks. These two methods, however, do not consider anticipated shocks and surprise
shocks together. In addition, the effects of anticipated and surprise government spending
shocks cannot be appreciated through a simple combination of the results found in these two
methods. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of anticipated and surprise government spending shocks in a unified framework to conclude that consumption decreases after
a positive government spending shock, whether the shock is anticipated or not. Ultimately,
this paper’s finding is contrary to the finding in SVAR literature.
Few economists have applied theoretical analysis to the anticipated aspect of government
spending shocks. The theoretical models devoted to the effects of government spending
shocks have been commonly divided into two different schools, the neo-classical school and
the neo-Keynesian school. This paper employs a neo-classical theoretical model, in which
wealth effect plays a critical role in explaining the effects of surprise government spending
shocks and anticipated government spending shocks. According to the neo-classical framework, when facing a surprise positive government spending shock, the optimal reaction for
an economic agent is to decrease consumption and increase labor supply. Although the empirical work also finds that consumption decreases after an anticipated positive shock, the
theoretical model explains that the dynamics of these findings differs depending on whether
the shock is anticipated or surprise. If an economic agent anticipates a future increase in
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government spending, the agent is willing to decrease consumption and increase labor supply
before the shock realization, in contrast to the case of surprise shocks. By reacting preemptively, the economic agent is able to attain a high consumption level in contrast to the case
of surprise shocks.
The following paper is divided into four sections. Section 2.2 presents empirical results
for the effects of surprise shocks and anticipated shocks of government spending. Section 2.3
develops a theoretical model featuring Epstein-Zin preferences and several real rigidities to
generate results supported by empirical work. Section 2.4 analyzes the underlying mechanism
of the theoretical model. Section 2.5 concludes this paper.

2.1.1

Literature Discussion

There are two strands of literature on the effects of government spending shocks1 and
these do not agree with each other on either empirical results or theoretical models. One
strand of literature adopts SVAR in empirical analysis. The SVAR method identifies government spending shocks by using the presence of decision lags or sign restrictions of government spending on macroeconomic variables. This strand of literature generally finds that
consumption, labor supply, and output all rise after positive government spending shocks.2
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) utilize institutional information to identify government spending shocks. They find consumption, labor supply, and output all increase after positive
government spending shocks. Theoretically, the results found by SVAR method are supported by neo-Keynesian models that feature sticky prices. The standard theoretical work is
Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007). Their model allows for the presence of rule-of-thumb
1

An excellent review of the effects of government spending shocks is Ramey (2011).
Studies that arrive at the same results include but are not limited to Perotti (2007); Monacelli and
Perotti (2008); Morten, Stephanie and Martin (2012).
2
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(non-Ricardian) consumers and shows how the non-Ricardian consumers behave under the
sticky prices. Their simulation results support the conclusion arrived at through SVAR.
Another strand of literature uses the narrative approach in empirical investigation. The
narrative approach identifies the government spending shocks by using periods of war, when
real defense spending changes, as instrumental variables. In contrast, the narrative method
finds consumption typically decreases after positive government spending shocks.3 This
method, however, predicts labor supply and output increase after positive government spending shocks. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) consider three war periods, the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan buildup, as exogenous shocks of real defense spending
and find that consumption and investment decrease while output and labor supply increase
after positive government spending shocks. Theoretically, the results found by the narrative
method are embraced in the neo-classical frame, in which wealth effect plays the important
role. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) provide the model of the neo-classical feature
in explaining the effects of government spending shocks. These models generally have real
rigidities such as habit formation and convex investment adjustment costs.
Although the two strands of studies have their benefits in explaining the effects of government spending shocks, neither strand considers the anticipation implied by the fiscal policy
itself. Leeper, Alexander and Todd (2012) identify two types of fiscal shocks, government
spending shocks and tax policies shocks, and two type of lags of fiscal shocks, legislative lag
and implementation lag. They map the reduced-form estimates of news into a DSGE framework and find that news of fiscal policy is time-varying; ignorance of this feature can have
important consequences for conventional macroeconomic models. Leeper, Walker and Yang
(2013) suggest that a non-fundamental problem4 ensues when applying SVAR to analyzing
3

Literature obtaining the same results includes but is not limited to Ramey and Shapiro (1998); Edelberga,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999); Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004); and McGrattan and Ohanian
(2010).
4
The discussion of non-fundamental problem in dynamic models can be found in Hansen and Sargent
(1980) and Lippi and Reichlin (1994).
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the fiscal shocks if the anticipation of the economic agent is overlooked.
Ramey (2011) points out that the two strands of literature have the same shortcoming.
They both overlook the anticipated aspect of government spending. Ramey uses an expectation augmented VAR (EVAR) to identify government spending shocks. EVAR analysis
makes use of a news series built by Ramey to incorporate expectation into the standard
SVAR analysis. The government spending shocks identified in EVAR predict, to a certain degree, the SVAR shocks identified in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Thus, Ramey
claims SVAR errs in estimating the effects of government spending shocks because of the
wrong timing assumption. Ramey (2011) still maintains the conclusion reached by the narrative approach. Several authors who dedicate to the anticipation property of fiscal policy,
however, do not agree with Ramey’s conclusion. Mertens and Ravn (2010) consider the
anticipation of government spending and estimate an augmented fiscal SVAR. They do not
find that the upswing in consumption after positive government spending shocks obtained
using SVAR is due to the misguided timing assumption. Forni and Gambetti (2010) use a
structural, large-dimensional, and dynamic factor model that avoids the non-fundamental
problem in SVAR. They find consumption and investment rise after positive government
spending shocks. Therefore, the debate on the effects of anticipated shocks of government
spending is ongoing.
Examining anticipation or expectation of government spending coincides with the emerging literature of news shocks. The literature usually divides shocks into two types, surprise
shocks and news shocks. News shocks are anticipated shocks that are predicted by economic
agents several periods prior to the event. Two different shocks usually have different effects
on macroeconomic variables. Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012) show the importance of news shocks in generating business cycles. Beaudry and
Portier (2004, 2007) comprehensively discuss how to generate news-driven business cycles in
a neo-classical frame. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) clarify three important factors, wealth
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effect, capital utilization rate, and investment adjustment costs in generating news-driven
business cycles. All these articles shed light on the mechanism of generating desirable results
of news shocks or anticipated shocks.

2.2

Empirical Evidence

2.2.1

Methodology

I use the empirical methodology adopted in Bansal et al. (2010); Colacito and Croce
(2011); Croce (2014); and Colacito et al. (2014). These authors use this methodology to
identify the effects of the long-run risk of productivity and consumption. Croce (2014) states
that the long-run risk of productivity is anticipated news for future productivity. The shortrun shocks identified in their methodology are essentially surprise shocks. Therefore, this
paper uses the methodology to study the effects of surprise shocks and anticipated shocks of
government spending. Following, I introduce the methodology and modify it to identify the
surprise shocks and anticipated shocks of government spending.
Let gt denote the government spending per capita in logarithm unit. The growth rate of
gt is decomposed as follows,
∆gt+1 = µ + xt + g,t+1 ,

(2.1)

where µ is the constant term in the auto-regression, xt is the component that helps to predict
the growth rate of gt , and g,t+1 is the unpredictable part of government spending.
The predictable component xt has the following AR (1) process,

xt = ρxt−1 + x,t ,

(2.2)
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where x,t is the residual of the auto-regression process and ρ implies the persistent of the
process.
For the distribution of g,t+1 and x,t+1 , we assume the binormal distribution as follows,






 



 x,t+1 
 0   σx ρx,g 
 ,

 ∼ iidN   , 
g,t+1
0
ρg,x σg

(2.3)

where ρx,g and ρg,x are set to zero5 in the following simulation of theoretical model.
The methodology is able to capture both surprise shocks and anticipated shocks of government spending after we integrate Equation 2.2 into Equation 2.1 and obtain the following
Equation 2.4,
∆gt+1 = µ + ρxt−1 + x,t + g,t+1 .

(2.4)

According to Equation 2.4, x,t is the information that economic agents observe at time
t+1 and x,t will be realized at time t+1. Thus, x,t is defined as one-period-ahead6 anticipated shocks of government spending according to the definition of anticipated shocks in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). g,t+1 is the unpredictable part of government spending
at time t+1 and thus defined as the surprise shocks of government spending. Therefore, if
we abstract x,t and g,t+1 and take them into regression with macroeconomic variables, we
attain the impact of anticipated shocks and surprise shocks on macroeconomic variables. As
a result, this paper takes advantage of the explanation of Equation 2.4 and uses the above
procedure to empirically investigate the influence of surprise shocks and anticipated shocks
of government spending.
5

The results of simulated theoretical model do not change even if the correlations are not set to zero.
The one-period-ahead does not necessary imply one-quarter-head. Actually, the following empirical
work investigates four-quarter-ahead anticipated government spending shocks, which is coinciding with the
following theoretical analysis.
6
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2.2.2

Data

The data7 used to implement the empirical analysis is part of the data used in Ramey
(2011). Table 2.1 lists all variables and their definitions in the data set used in this paper. The
data set has ten variables ranging from 1939q1-2008q4. For all GDP related macroeconomic
variables, they are quality indexes and not proper to add. These variables are divided by
total population and taken in log-unit. Therefore, all GDP related macroeconomic variables
are valued in per capita with log-unit when carrying out empirical analysis. All variables in
the regressions are on quarter-basis. The variable “Pdvmily”, a news series built by Ramey,
needs special attention in the table since it is not published by government. According to
Ramey’s description, the “Pdvmily” is the expected discounted value of changes in real defense spending. The calculation is based on the information obtained through mainstream
periodicals such as Business Week and New York Times. This variable gauges the public’s
expectations of real defense spending. As demonstrated in Ramey (2011), this variable has
great prediction power in forecasting real defense spending. The consumption per capita
data used in the empirical analysis does not differentiate between durable consumption and
non-durable consumption. The reason I use consumption per capita without separation is
to construct the following theoretical model. This model does not consider the difference
between durable consumption and non-durable consumption. Real nonresidential fixed investment per capita is used in the empirical analysis since it is the major part of domestic
investment. Total hours worked needs to be divided by total population to calculate hours
worked per capita. The Average Marginal Tax Rate of Barro-Redlick (2011) is of annual
frequency and thus repeatedly used for quarters rather than interpolated. The interest rate
7

The data is available from Ramey’s UCSD website: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~vramey/research.
html#data.
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on 3-month T-bills is nominal interest.

Table 2.1: Variables in the Data Set
Variable

Definition

Variable

Definition

rgdp

real gross domestic product

pdvmily

a news series of government spending

rgov

real government spending

hours

total hours worked

rdef

real defense spending

totpop

total population

rcons

real total consumption

amtbr

Barro-Redlick Avg. Marginal Tax Rate

rnri

real nonresidential fixed investment

tb3

interest rate on 3-month T-bills

Figure 2.1 shows the trend of real GDP per capita, real government spending per capita,
and the ratio of nominal government spending over nominal GDP. The data used for plotting
the ratio of nominal government spending over nominal GDP is from NIPA Accounts of
government spending. It is the same sauce with Ramey’s data set. I follow Ramey(2011)
to use the nominal variables to calculate the ratio. From Figure 2.1, we observe that both
real GDP per capita and real government spending per capita have time trends. Although
the trend of real government spending per capita is smoother than the trend of real GDP
per capita, this paper assumes they have the same trend in the following theoretical model
according to the literature on business cycles. The ratio of nominal government spending to
nominal GDP is the parameter used to calculate proportional income tax rate at the steady
state in the following theoretical model according to the description in Baxter and King
(2003). The ratio is very high between 1950 and 1970 because of military build-up. After
that, the ratio experiences a slow decline until 2000. The ratio increases significantly in the
period surrounding the 2008 finance crisis: this increase shows the importance of government
spending as a policy tool to stabilize the economy. After 2010, the ratio decreases by time.
The average ratio is taken as the approximate value of the proportional income tax rate.
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Figure 2.1: GDP and Government Spending

Government spending in NIPA Accounts can be divided into two different categories,
defense spending and non-defense spending. Figure 2.2 shows the series of real government
spending per capita and real defense spending per capita. The two series follow almost the
same pattern. Thus, the argument in Ramey (2011) in which real defense spending shocks are
well-defined government spending shocks, is convincingly established. This paper, however,
takes shocks of real government spending as a supplement to making empirical reference.
Also, it is necessary for this paper to investigate the time series after 1947, since there are no
dramatic changes for both real government spending per capita and real defense spending
capita after World War II. This feature has significant influence on the following empirical
results.
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Figure 2.2: Real Government Spending and Real Defense Spending

2.2.3

Regression and Results

The empirical analysis is based on shocks of both real government spending and real
defense spending8 , which are divided into two different time periods, 1939q1-2008q4 and
1947q1-2008q4. Ramey (2011) argues real defense spending shocks are exogenous and more
likely to be treated as government spending shocks. Ramey’s argument is reasonable according to Figure 2.2; however, other researchers still use real government spending in their
empirical analysis. This paper thus uses both series to identify shocks of government spending.9
8

For saving space, this paper will use real government spending instead of real government spending per
capita and real defense spending instead of real defense spending per capita in this and following section.
9
Blanchard and Perotti(2002), for example, use government spending in SVAR analysis.
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Before we start the procedure described in Section 2.2.1, preliminary work will indicate
whether the real government spending series and real defense spending series are persistent
processes. The requirement for the procedure described in Section 2.2.1 is that the time
series has to be persistent and predicted by some components according to Colacito and
Croce (2011). The predictability of real government spending and real defense spending will
be discussed later in this section.
Table 2.2 reports the results of autoregression of real government spending and real defense spending in different time periods. As we see from Table 2.2, these two series are
highly persistent in four samples. Therefore, these two series are eligible for the analysis of
procedure in Section 2.2.1.

Table 2.2: Persistence of Real Government Spending and Real Defense Spending
Real government Spending

1939q1-2008q4

1947q1-2008q4

β

.9955∗∗∗

.9993∗∗∗

Real Defense Spending

1939q1-2008q4

1947q1-2008q4

β

.9969∗∗∗

.9890∗∗∗

* denotes p-values smaller than 10%.
** denotes p-values smaller than 5%.
*** denotes p-values smaller than 1%.

Empirically, spurious regression is a fatal problem in time series analysis. Therefore, I
test the stationarity of all time series used in the empirical work. Before the formal test, I
plot all the time series in Figure 2.3. From Figure 2.3, we observe a significant time trend in
real GDP per capita, real consumption per capita, and real nonresidential fixed investment
per capita. Observing the time locus of the other six variables, except for the new series, may
not indicate stationarity, even if they do not have a determinant time trend. Therefore, I use
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the Dickey-Fuller test to examine the stationarity of the five time series. The results of the
test are reported in Table 2.3. Real defense spending and real government spending are stationary while hours worked per capita and nominal interest rate are not stationary. Average
marginal tax rate passes the test; however, the statistic is on the margin. Therefore, it is not
safe to include the level value of the average marginal tax rate in the regression. I also plot
the first difference series of each variable in Figure 2.4. From the Figure 2.4, we find the first
difference series of each variable is stationary and thus safe to be included into the regression.

Figure 2.3: Time Series in Regressions
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Table 2.3: Test of Stationarity
Interpolated Dickey-Fuller
Variable

Test Statistic

1 % Critical Value

5 % Critical Value

10% Critical Value

rdef

−7.306

−3.989

−3.429

−3.130

rgov

−6.316

−3.989

−3.429

−3.130

hours

−2.446

−3.989

−3.429

−3.130

amtbr

−3.903

−3.989

−3.429

−3.130

tb3

−1.935

−3.989

−3.429

−3.130

Figure 2.4: Fisrt Difference of Time Series in Regressions
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A group of regressions are designed for real defense spending and real government spending from 1939q1 to 2008q4 and 1947q1 to 2008q4. The following is the prediction equation
used for two variables in both sample periods,
∆rdeft = µ+α1 pdvmilyt−4 + α2 ∆rgdpt−4 + α4 ∆rconst−4 + α4 ∆rnrit−4 + α5 ∆hourst−4 + α6 ∆amtbrt−4 + α7 ∆tb3t−4 +g,t ,
|
{z
}
xt

(2.5)

where g,t is abstracted as surprise shocks of real defense spending.
xt includes several variables to predict the growth rate of real defense spending and has
the following process,
xt = ρx xt−1 + x,t ,

(2.6)

where εx,t is considered as the anticipated shocks of real defense spending.
The definitions of variables used in Equation 2.5 are listed in Table 2.1. As stated in
Section 2.2.2, “Pdvmily” is the variable that gauges the public’s expectation of changes in
real defense spending. Therefore, the “Pdvmily” has already captured the major prediction
powder that economic agents can perceive in the daily life. Other variables are also easy to
be gathered by economic agents and help them to predict real defense spending. The choice
of four lags is to consider the expectation capacity of economic agents. Economic agents
are able to include information four quarters ago to predict the growth rate of real defense
spending.
After abstracting two kinds of shocks from real defense spending, I regress each macroeconomic variable to these two shocks to get the signs indicating the influence of surprise
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shocks and anticipated shocks on each variable. The following four equations are used to
estimate the signs of shocks on each macroeconomic variable,

∆rgdpt = µy + β∆y|x xt−1 + β∆y|x x,t + β∆y|g g,t + y,t

(2.7)

∆rconst = µc + β∆c|x xt−1 + β∆c|x x,t + β∆c|g g,t + c,t

(2.8)

∆rnrit = µi + β∆i|x xt−1 + β∆i|x x,t + β∆i|g g,t + i,t

(2.9)

∆hourst = µh + β∆h|x xt−1 + β∆h|x x,t + β∆h|g g,t + h,t ,

(2.10)

where Equation 2.7 is designed for the impact of shocks on output, Equation 2.8 for the
impact of shocks on consumption, Equation 2.9 for the impact of shocks on investment, and
Equation 2.10 for the impact of shocks on labor supply.
According to econometric theory, this is not spurious regression since every variable used
in all regressions is stationary. I use GMM with correction for heteroscedasticity to estimate
the coefficients in every regression. Also, endogeneity test is performed after GMM estimations and thus endogeneity is strictly excluded from every regression.
Table 2.4 reports the regression results for predictability of real defense spending from
1939q1 to 2008q4 and 1947q1 to 2008q4. ρ is 0.60, which indicates the process of anticipated
shocks is persistent for the sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4. The ρ is comparatively
low for the sample period from 1947q1 to 2008q4. Four coefficients are very significant at 1%
level and three coefficients are not significant for the sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4.
As shown in Figure 2.2, there are bigger changes from 1939 to 1947, and thus, it is hard to
predict the changes by using certain variables in sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4. For
the sample period from 1947q1 to 2008q4, six coefficients are significant while one coefficient
is not significant. The coefficients for the sample period from 1947q1 to 2008q4 are more
significant at higher level because there are comparatively smaller changes during this period.
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Table 2.4: Predictability of Real Defense Spending
Real Defense Sample
Equation 2.6

Equation 2.5

ρ

α1

α2

α3

α4

α5

α6

α7

1939q1-2008q4

1947q1-2008q4

.60∗∗∗

.45∗∗∗

(.0341)

(.0257)

.2237∗∗∗

.2371∗∗∗

(.0299)

(.0101)

−.2389

.8114∗∗∗

(.3907)

(.3005)

.1275

−.3158∗∗∗

(.3396)

(.1191)

.0852

.0045

(.1519)

(.0672)

3.6628∗∗∗

.2749∗∗∗

(1.3649)

(.0999)

1.0542∗∗∗

.5056∗∗

(.2369)

(.2321)

−.0147∗∗

−.0049∗∗∗

(.0062)

(.0012)

* denotes p-values smaller than 10%.
** denotes p-values smaller than 5%.
*** denotes p-values smaller than 1%.

Table 2.5 shows the effects of anticipated shocks and surprise shocks on each macroeconomic variable for real defense spending from 1939q1 to 2008q4 and 1947q1 to 2008q4. The
statistic R2 for the sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4 is higher than sample period from
1939q1 to 2008q4 because there are comparative bigger changes in real defense spending
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from 1939 to 1947. For the sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4, both anticipated shocks
and surprise shocks have positive and significant effect on output and labor supply. Both anticipated shocks and surprise shocks have negative and significant effect on consumption and
investment. For the sample period from 1947q1 to 2008q4, anticipated shocks have a positive
but insignificant effect on output while surprise shocks have a positive and significant effect
on output. Anticipated shocks have a positive but insignificant effect on consumption while
surprise shocks have a negative and significant effect on consumption. Anticipated shocks
and surprise shocks have reverse and insignificant effects on investment and labor supply.
Anticipated shocks have a positive but insignificant effect on investment and a negative but
insignificant effect on labor supply. Surprise shocks have a negative but insignificant on
investment and a negative but insignificant on labor supply.

Table 2.5: Effects of Real Defense Spending Shocks
Real Defense Spending 1939q1-2008q4
Equation 2.7
β1
.0783∗∗∗
β2
.0706∗∗∗
Equation 2.8
β1
−.0255∗∗∗
β2
−.0242∗∗∗
Equation 2.9
β1
−.2784∗∗∗
β2
−.0782∗∗∗
Equation 2.10
β1
.0439∗∗∗
β2
.0475∗∗∗

1947q1-2008q4
.0036
.0553∗∗∗
.0176
−.0299∗∗∗
.0090
−.0331
−.0354
.0189

* denotes p-values smaller than 10%.
** denotes p-values smaller than 5%.
*** denotes p-values smaller than 1%.
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Table 2.6: Predictability of Real Government Spending
Real Defense Sample
Equation 2.6

Equation 2.5

ρ

α1

α2

α3

α4

α5

α6

α7

1939q1-2008q4

1947q1-2008q4

.62∗∗∗

.47∗∗∗

(.0326)

(.0277)

.1381∗∗∗

.1367∗∗∗

(.0151)

(.0038)

−.3186

.3072∗∗∗

(.2990)

(.0712)

.2662

−.1018∗∗∗

(.2420)

(.0298)

−.0696

.0472∗

(.0552)

(.0253)

2.2808∗∗∗

.0304

(.8466)

(.0537)

.4285∗∗∗

.2479∗∗

(.0936)

(.1043)

−.0064∗∗

−.0019∗∗∗

(.0027)

(.0004)

* denotes p-values smaller than 10%.
** denotes p-values smaller than 5%.
*** denotes p-values smaller than 1%.

To check if the above results are robust, this paper repeats the procedure used for real
defense spending by using the sample of real government spending. Table 2.6 lists the regression results for the predictability of real government spending from 1939q1 to 2008q4
and 1947q1 to 2008q4. ρ is 0.62, which indicates the process of anticipated shocks is per-
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sistent for the sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4. ρ is comparative lower for the sample
period from 1947 to 2008q4. Four coefficients are highly significant at 5% level while three
coefficients are not significant for the sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4. Six coefficients
are significant and one is not significant for the sample period from 1947q1-2008q4. The
same reason that there are comparative bigger changes in real defense spending from 1939
to 1947 works here too.

Table 2.7: Effects of Real Government Spending Shocks
Real Defense Spending

1939q1-2008q4

1947q1-2008q4

Equation 2.7
β1

.1540∗∗∗

.0174

β2

.1370∗∗∗

.1174∗∗∗

Equation 2.8
β1

−.0582∗∗∗

.0104

β2

−.0798∗∗∗

−.0730

Equation 2.9
β1

−.4822∗∗∗

.0104

β2

−.2874∗∗∗

−.1020∗∗

Equation 2.10
β1

.0897∗∗∗

−.0698

β2

.0950∗∗∗

.0421∗∗∗

* denotes p-values smaller than 10%.
** denotes p-values smaller than 5%.
*** denotes p-values smaller than 1%.
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Table 2.7 reports the effects of anticipated shocks and surprise shocks on each macroeconomic variable for real government spending from 1939q1 to 2008q4 and 1947q1 to 2008q4.
The effects for the sample period from 1939q1-2008q4 are more significant than sample period from 1947-2008q4 because there are bigger changes contained in the sample period from
1939q1-2008q4 according to the Figure 2.2. For the sample period from 1939q1 to 2008q4,
both anticipated shocks and surprise shocks have positive and significant effect on output
and labor supply. Both anticipated shocks and surprise shocks have negative and significant
effect on consumption and investment. For the sample period from 1947q1-2008q4, anticipated shocks have a positive but insignificant effect on output while surprise shocks have a
positive and significant effect on output. Anticipated shocks have a positive but insignificant effect on consumption while surprise shocks have a negative but insignificant effect on
consumption. Surprise shocks have a negative and significant effect on investment while anticipated shocks have a positive but insignificant effect on investment. Surprise shocks have
a positive and significant effect on labor supply while anticipated shocks have a negative but
insignificant effect on labor supply.

2.2.4

Summary and Inferences

Table 2.8 gathers all effects indicated by the signs for real defense spending and real
government spending from 1939q1 to 2008q4 and 1947q1 to 2008q4. Based on the Table 2.8,
I make four inferences for the effects of anticipated shocks and surprise shocks of government
spending on output, consumption, investment and labor supply. The first inference is that
anticipated shocks and surprise shocks of government spending have positive effect on output.
From Table 2.8, we observe that four signs of anticipated shocks are positive and two of them
are significant for two variables in two samples. Also, we observe that fours signs of surprise
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shocks are positive and significant for two variables in two samples. Therefore, whether the
shocks are anticipated or not, the effect on output is positive. The second inference is that
anticipated shocks and surprise shocks have negative effect on consumption. From Table 2.8,
we observe all four signs of anticipated shocks are divided into two negative signs and two
positive signs for two variables in two samples. The negative signs are significant while the
positive signs are not significant. Therefore, it is safe to say anticipated shocks have a negative effect on consumption by comparing significance of signs. For the effects of surprise
shocks on consumption, four signs are all negative and three of them are significant for two
variables in two samples. Therefore, surprise shocks also have a negative effect on consumption. Consequently, it is safe to make the inference that whether shocks are anticipated or
not, they have negative effect on consumption. For investment, anticipated shocks have negative and significant effect in the sample period from 1939q1-2008q4 for two variables while
they have positive but insignificant effect in the sample period from 1939q1-2008q4 for two
variables. By comparing the significance, we conclude that anticipated shocks have a negative effect on investment. The signs of surprise shocks are all negative and there of them are
significant for two variables in two samples. Therefore, surprise shocks also have a negative
effect on investment. As a result, it is safe to conclude anticipated shocks and surprise shocks
have negative effect on investment. For investment, anticipated shocks have positive effect
in the sample period from 1939q1-2008q4 for two variables while they have negative but
insignificant effect in the sample period from 1939q1-2008q4 for two variables. One positive
sign of anticipated shocks in sample period from 1939q1-2008q4 for real defense spending is
significant in the table. Therefore, by comparing the significance, we reach the conclusion
that anticipated shocks have a positive effect on labor supply. The signs of surprise shocks
are all positive for labor supply and there of them are significant for two variables in two
samples. Therefore, surprise shocks also have a positive effect on investment. As a result,
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we conclude that anticipated shocks and surprise shocks have a positive effect on labor supply.

Table 2.8: Summary of Effects on Macroeconomic Variables
Anticipated Shocks

Surprised Shocks

Sample Periods

rdef

rgov

rdef

rgov

1939q1-2008q4

+∗∗∗

+∗∗∗

+∗∗∗

+∗∗∗

1947q1-2008q4

+

+

+∗∗∗

+∗∗∗

1939q1-2008q4

−∗∗∗

−∗∗∗

−∗∗∗

−∗∗∗

1947q1-2008q4

+

+

−∗∗∗

−

1939q1-2008q4

−∗∗∗

−∗∗∗

−∗∗∗

−∗∗∗

1947q1-2008q4

+

+

−

−∗∗∗

1939q1-2008q4

+∗∗∗

+

+∗∗∗

+∗∗∗

1947q1-2008q4

−

−

+

+∗∗∗

Output

Consumption

Investment

Labor Supply

* denotes p-values smaller than 10%.
** denotes p-values smaller than 5%.
*** denotes p-values smaller than 1%.

The inferences about the effects of surprise government spending shocks are contradictory to the findings reached by SVAR approach. The SVAR methodology typically finds
consumption rises after surprise positive government spending shocks while this paper documents consumption falls after surprise positive government spending shocks. The inferences,
however, are still corroborated by papers in current literature. Baxter and King (2003) show
temporary surprise shocks have a positive effect on output and labor supply, negative effect
on consumption and investment. Ramey (2011) shows anticipated shocks have a positive
effect on output and labor supply, and a negative effect on consumption and investment.
Thus, the inferences here still coincide with the existing literature.
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2.3

Model and Main Results

2.3.1

Model Economy

The economy is populated by infinite identical agents who gain utility from the composite
goods. The representative agent has the following utility function,
1−γ
θ

et
Ut = {(1 − β)C

where θ =

1−γ
1
1− ψ

1

θ

1−γ θ 1−γ
+ β(Et Ut+1
) } ,

(2.11)

.

e is the current composite consumption of the representative agent. The parameter γ
C
is risk aversion and ψ is intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) for the representative
agent. β is the subjective discount rate. Et is the conditional expectation operator on the
information at time t.
e is consisting of consumption and labor supply and has the following form,
C
et = Ct − φXt Ntη .
C

(2.12)

η is the parameter governing the elasticity of labor supply. φ is the parameter associated
with the term of labor supply Nt . Ct is the current consumption of the representative agent.
The representative agent chooses her own labor supply in the optimal plan, which avoids the
negative consequence of the composite consumption.
Xt is the habit level of consumption. It is related with the current consumption and
previous habit level. The evolutionary process of Xt is as follows,
1−ω
Xt = Ctω Xt−1
,

(2.13)
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where ω represents the degree of dependence on which the habit level relies in current
consumption.
The utility function is that of typical Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) preferences
(i.e., Epstein-Zin preferences). If ψ > γ1 , the representative agent is risk averse. Epstein-Zin
preferences is widely used in finance literature to achieve a desirable equity premium because
the preferences breaks the link between risk aversion and IES. Since the representative agent
does cares not only about the expected discount value of consumption flows but also about
the variation of consumption flows, the Epstein-Zin preferences reacts to the anticipated
shocks as contrast to the commonly used preferences. Specifically, the representative agent
cares about the stability of consumption flows when facing government spending shocks if
the representative agent is risk averse.
The output is produced by a constant to scale technology,

Yt = At Ktα Nt1−α ,

(2.14)

where Kt is the capital used in production, Nt is the labor used in production and α is the
capital output ratio.
At is the neutral technological progress and has the following evolving equation,

log(At ) = ρA log(At−1 ) + εA,t ,

(2.15)

where εA,t is the shocks to technological progress and ρA indicates the persistent of the
technological shocks.
εA,t includes anticipated shocks and surprise shocks of technological progress that are
listed in the following description. The surprise shocks of technological progress are broadly
discussed in the literature of real business cycles (RBC) and thus treated as touchstone to test
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the theoretical model. Anticipated shocks of technological progress are also investigated in
the theoretical model. The presence of surprise shocks and anticipated shocks of technological
progress, however, does not influence the results of surprise and anticipated government
spending shocks.
The capital accumulation process with investment adjustment costs is listed as follows,

Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Φ(

It
)Kt ,
Kt

(2.16)

where δ is the depreciate rate of capital and Φ( KItt ) is the convex adjustment costs.
The adjustment function, Φ( KItt ), is the form used in Jermann (1998),
Φ(

It
a0
It 1− 1ξ
)=
)
+ a1 ,
1(
Kt
1 − ξ Kt

(2.17)

where ξ is the elasticity of investment to Tobin’s q, and a0 , a1 are the parameters for
adjustment function.
According to Jermann (1998), the capital accumulation equation is the same as the
traditional capital accumulation equation without adjustment costs at the steady state.
Therefore, a0 and a1 are determined by comparing the two different equations at the steady
state.
Government finances its spending and transfer by collecting a proportional income tax.
The following is the government’s budget constraint,

Gt + T Rt = τ Yt ,

(2.18)
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where Gt is government spending, T Rt is government transfer and τ is income tax rate.
Assume g is the steady state value of Gt , the government spending process is modeled as
follows,
log(

Gt−1
Gt
) = ρg log(
) + εg,t ,
g
g

(2.19)

where ρ indicates the persistence of the process and εg,t is the government spending shocks
including surprise shocks and anticipated shocks.
According to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), surprise shocks and anticipated shocks of
government spending and technological innovation can be expressed in the following form,

εg,t = g,t + g,t−4

(2.20)

εA,t = A,t + A,t−4 .

(2.21)

g,t and A,t are information received by economic agents at time t while g,t−4 and A,t−4
are information received by economic agents four-quarter-ahead but realized at time t. Therefore, g,t is surprise shocks of government spending and A,t is surprise shocks of technological
progress. g,t−4 is government spending shocks anticipated four-quarter-ahead and A,t−4 is
technological shocks anticipated four-quarter-ahead according to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012).
To complete the artificial model, the budget constraint for the economy is as follows,

Ct + It + Gt = Yt .

(2.22)
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2.3.2

Simulation and Results

Table 2.9 lists parameters used in simulating the model. α, the capital share, is set to 0.36
to match the capital output ratio in U.S. time series. β, the subjective discount rate, is set to
0.996 for the desirable risk free rate. ρA and ρg are both set to 0.98 to make the technological
shocks and government spending shocks persistent over time. The proportional income tax
rate is set to 0.21, the average ratio of nominal government spending over nominal GDP,
as mentioned before. δ is set to 0.025, which is uniform in business cycle literature. Other
parameters are calibrated to match the empirical results.

Table 2.9: Parameters for Calibration
Parameter

Value

Parameter

Value

Parameter

Value

α

0.36

γ

8

ξ

4

ψ

0.2

δ

0.025

η

1.4

β

0.996

τ

0.21

ρA

0.98

ρg

0.98

A

0.01

g

0.01

By using DYNARE, the theoretical model is simulated and the impulse response graphs
are obtained. DYNARE uses the perturbation method when carrying out simulations. The
method is appropriate here since the utility function and the production function imply a
balanced growth path. I use third order perturbation in the simulation to capture the specific property of Epstein-Zin preferences. The simulation runs 280 periods to cover the time
period from 1939q1 to 2008q4.
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Figure 2.5: Surprise Shocks of Technological Progress

Figure 2.5 shows the impulse responses of output (Y), consumption (C), investment (I)
and labor supply (N) to a surprise positive technological shock. From Figure 2.5, output
increases after a surprise positive technological shock. The growth of output does not decay
dramatically as the persistence of technological shock and the short response periods are
shown in the graph. Investment and consumption also increase after a surprise positive
technological shock. Investment, however, increases more than output, while consumption
increases less than output. All these results coincide with the prediction of the standard
business cycle theory.
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Figure 2.6: Anticipated Shocks of Technological Progress

Figure 2.6 offers the impulse responses of output (Y), consumption (C), investment (I),
and labor supply (N) to an anticipated positive technological shock. This theoretical model
does not replicate the results in the literature of anticipated positive technological shocks
under the parameters listed in Table 2.9. The reason is that the model is calibrated under
high wealth effect even if the model keeps partially the same features as in Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2009). If the representative agent expects higher income in the near future, then the
labor supply falls prior to the realization of anticipated technological improvement because
of the high wealth effect. Output decreases before the realization of future technological
progress because of the decline of labor supply. Because of the habit formation and the
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risk aversion of consumption variation implied by the preferences, the representative agent
maintains its consumption level prior to the realization of future higher productivity. Therefore, the investment decreases to satisfy the budget constraint. After implementation of the
technological improvement, output, consumption, investment and labor supply all increase
similar to the effects of surprise positive technological progress.

Figure 2.7: Surprise Shocks of Government Spending

Figure 2.7 shows the impulse responses of output (Y), consumption (C), investment
(I) and labor supply (N) to a surprise positive government spending shock. Labor supply
increases because of the negative wealth effect. As a result, output also increases. Con-
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sumption, however, decreases to react optimally to the positive government spending shock.
Investment also decreases because of the growth of government spending.

Figure 2.8: Anticipated Shocks of Government Spending

Figure 2.8 shows the impulse responses of output (Y), consumption (C), investment (I)
and labor supply (N) to an anticipated positive government spending shock. The representative agent anticipates the future growth of government spending: the agent knows the
wealth will decrease in the near future. To offset the influence, the agent increases labor
supply and decreases consumption before the realization of the positive government shock.
As shown in Figure 2.8, government spending experiences an almost permanent growth after the fourth quarter. Output increases before the realization of the positive government
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spending shock because of the growth of labor supply caused by the negative wealth effect. After the realization of the positive government spending shock, government spending
does not decay in the short periods because of the shock’s persistence. Therefore, the labor
supply and output continue growing. Although consumption does not change dramatically
during the first three quarters, it decreases between the third quarter and the four quarter,
then increases to its normal level between fourth quarter and fifth quarter. The impulse of
consumption shows that the economic agent is trying to maintain a consumption level if the
agent’s consumption habit level relies more on current consumption. Investment increases
before the realization of positive government spending shock due to the growth of output and
the almost unchanged level of consumption. Yet, investment decreases to meet the budget
constraint after government spending reaches its high level.

Figure 2.9: Anticipated Shocks Vs Surpirse Shocks

36
Comparing the effects of an anticipated positive government spending shock with the
effects of a surprise positive government spending shock, we find different dynamics even
if they are both supported by the empirical findings. Figure 2.9 shows the comparison between a surprise positive government spending shock and an anticipated positive government
spending shock. From Figure 2.9, we see that the economic agent gains higher consumption level by increasing labor supply and decreasing consumption in advance. The agent
increases labor supply before the realization of the anticipated shock and thus attains the
growth of output before the shock realization. The investment rises because the decline of
consumption and increase of output before the realization of the anticipated shock. After
the shock realization, the agent supplies more labor than the situation under the surprise
shock. Therefore, the agent is able to attain higher growth of output compared with the
situation under the surprise shock. Consumption decreases more in short periods around
the anticipated shock, and increases to the original level since the higher growth rate of
output under the anticipated shock. Investment decreases to meet the budget because of
the positive increase of government spending. The reason why the agent has higher consumption level under an anticipated positive government spending shock is that the agent
is willing to sacrifice today’s consumption for future higher output and ultimately obtains
higher consumption level if the agent expects future increase of government spending.
In conclusion, the theoretical model satisfies the results demonstrated in the empirical analysis. The theoretical model demonstrates two corresponding features convincingly:
consumption decreases and output increases after a positive government spending shock,
whether the shock is anticipated or not.
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2.4

Model Mechanisms

How the theoretical model generates these desirable results is straightforward. Facing
a positive government spending shock, the optimal action of a representative agent is to
decrease consumption and increase labor supply whether the shock is anticipated or not.
This adjustment is efficiently demonstrated in the same neo-classical theoretical frame that
I use to build the artificial model in this paper. The difference between an anticipated
positive government spending shock and a surprise positive government spending shock is
that if the agent anticipates the shock, he or she is willing to adjust relevant behavior before
the realization of the shock.
In the process of adjustment, the level of wealth effect and the elasticity of labor supply
are two important factors helping to generate desirable results. The combination of a high
level of wealth effect or the habit level closely correlated with current consumption and
high elasticity of labor supply are required to generate the theoretical results supported by
empirical work.

2.4.1

Level of Wealth Effect

The parameter ω governs the wealth effect according to Equation 2.12. If ω = 1, then
utility has a strong wealth effect in the short run and utility belongs to the kind shown in
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) (KPR). If ω = 0, then utility has no wealth effect and the
utility belongs to the kind shown in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) (GHH). If
the value of ω is in between, then the wealth effect increases as the value of ω increases. The
theoretical model also features the habit formation in consumption. The level of habit also
depends on the parameter ω, which is implied in Equation 2.13. Equation 2.13 shows the
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level of habit is closely related to current consumption if ω is of high value. For the theoretical model, we need a powerful wealth effect to generate a positive response of labor supply
and output after a positive government spending shock. The high value of ω means the habit
is more dependent on current consumption, which in turn implies the representative agent is
not willing to adjust its current consumption path when the agents initial optimal action is
to decrease consumption. If the value of ω is low, consumption may possibly increase after a
positive government spending shock. Therefore, the value of ω needs to be carefully assigned
to generate higher output and to maintain the consumption path after the first decrease.

Figure 2.10: Surprise Shocks of Government Spending(ω = 0.05)
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Figure 2.10 shows the impulse responses after a surprise positive government spending
shock under the parameter ω = 0.05. The output, however, decreases during the period after
a surprise positive shock compared with Figure 2.7 with ω = 0.5. The simulated results are
not supported by the empirical research. Comparing Figure 2.10 with Figure 2.7, we see
the labor supply increases because of the negative wealth effect even if the wealth effect is
smaller at the value of ω = 0.05. The labor supply, however, does not increase as much
as it does when the value of ω is high, because of the smaller negative wealth effect. In
addition, the decline of consumption under the parameter ω = 0.05 is not as great as it is
under ω = 0.5. As a result, the output is used up by consumption increase and government
spending increase under the surprise positive government spending shock with ω = 0.05.

Figure 2.11: Anticipated Shocks of Government Spending(ω = 0.05)
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Figure 2.11 shows the impulse responses after an anticipated positive government spending shock at the parameter ω = 0.05 as the situation under surprise shocks. Before the
realization of the anticipated shock, the representative agent knows the optimal action is
to increase current labor supply and decrease current consumption as demonstrated in the
situation of an anticipated positive government spending shock. The representative agent,
however, decreases current labor supply and decreases more consumption compared with the
case of high value of ω because of the low negative wealth effect and the less dependent on
current consumption implied by the low value of ω. As a result, prior to the realization of
positive government spending shocks, the output decreases as the labor supply decreases,
which is not supported by the empirical findings. After the realization of the anticipated
shocks, the representative agent gradually increases the labor supply. Output increases as
the result of increasing labor supply. Compared to its initial level, consumption also increases after the shock realization. As a result, investment is comparatively lower in every
period relative to the situation under a high value of ω. The results of an anticipated positive
government spending shock under low value of ω still conform to the empirical findings after
the realization of the anticipated shock.

2.4.2

Elasticity of Labor Supply

Facing an unexpected increase in government spending, decreasing wealth is the direct
impact on the representative agent. The optimal action of the representative agent is to
increase labor supply and decrease consumption. If the elasticity of labor supply is low, the
labor supply does not increase at the same level it does during conditions of high elasticity
of labor supply. As a result, the output may decrease after a short-term increase.
The parameter η governs the elasticity of labor supply. The higher the value of η, the
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lower the elasticity of labor supply. Thus, a high value of η creates the decline of output in
the short term. The first order condition for the labor supply is listed in Equation 2.23 and
Equation 2.24 by solving the optimal problem of the representative agent,

Vt

Vt

θ−1+γ
θ

θ−1+γ
θ

e 1−γ−θ
θ
+ µt ωCtω−1 Xt1−ω = λt
(1 − β)C

e
(1 − β)C

1−γ−θ
θ

φηNtη−1 Xt = λt (1 − α)At Ktα Nt−α ,

(2.23)

(2.24)

where λt and µt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with Equation 2.12 and Equation 2.13.
If we consider the situation of GHH preferences, then Equation 2.23 and Equation 2.24
degenerate to the following equation,

φηNtη−1 Xt = Wt ,

(2.25)

where Wt is the real wage.
By manipulating the Equation 2.25, we get the following labor supply function,
1

Wt η−1
.
Nt =
φηXt
Thus, if η increases, then labor supply decreases given η > 1.

(2.26)
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Figure 2.12: Surprise Shocks of Government Spending(η = 6)

Figure 2.12 shows the impulse responses of a surprise positive government spending shock
at η = 6. Compared with Figure 2.7 produced by η = 1.4, the output decreases after around
the eighth quarter, which is not supported by our empirical results. By comparing Figure 2.12 with Figure 2.7, we observe that the increase of labor supply under low elasticity
of labor supply is less than it is in conditions of high elasticity during the short term and
therefore so is the output. As a result, the output is consumed by the increase of government
spending. Output ultimately decreases after certain periods.
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Figure 2.13: Anticipated Shocks of Government Spending(η = 6)

The anticipated shocks under low elasticity of labor supply, however, do not change the
main results of the theoretical model. Figure 2.13 shows the dynamics of the theoretical
model under low elasticity of labor supply. The growth of output, consumption, investment,
and labor supply remains lower than it would be under high elasticity of labor supply following the realization of the anticipated positive government spending shock. The results
of an anticipated positive government spending shock under low elasticity of labor supply,
however, are not contrary to the empirical findings.

44

2.5

Conclusion

This paper distinguishes between surprise government spending shocks and anticipated
government spending shocks and subsequently empirically investigates the impact of these
two shocks on macroeconomic variables by using a new econometric method. This paper finds consumption and investment decrease after positive government spending shocks
whether shocks are anticipated or not, while output and labor supply increase after positive
government spending shocks whether shocks are anticipated or not. Following the empirical
investigation, I develop a theoretical model to successfully explain the empirical findings
by assuming Epstein-Zin preferences as well as several real rigidities. Usually, economists
focus on either surprise shocks of government spending implied in SVAR literature, or anticipated shocks of government spending embodied in the EVAR literature. This paper’s
comprehensive consideration of surprise shocks and anticipated shocks is an innovation in
the literature of government spending. The empirical results show output and labor supply
increase, while consumption and investment decrease under a positive government spending
shock whether the shock is anticipated or not. These results can aid policymakers as they
manipulate government spending as a fiscal policy to stabilize or stimulate the economy.

CHAPTER 3
NEWS SHOCKS AND ASSET RETURNS

3.1

Introduction

Significant recent literature attempts to explain asset returns in business cycles that are
driven by realized productivity shocks. Few of these studies, however, successfully explain
asset returns at business cycle frequency. The thesis of news-driven business cycles is now
the prevailing topic in the literature of business cycles. Business cycles driven by the news
of future productivity innovation differ from business cycles driven by realized productivity
innovation.1 Studies concerning news-driven business cycles generally focus on the generating mechanism of news-driven business cycles or the empirical evidence for the existence of
news-driven business cycles. Few studies, however, discuss asset returns in the news-driven
business cycles. Therefore, a logical question arises for examination: can we explain asset
returns in news-driven business cycles? This paper addresses this problem and attains desirable equity premium and risk-free rate in news-driven business cycles under reasonable
parameters.
The theoretical model in this paper adopts Epstein-Zin preferences and convex investment adjustment costs to explain asset returns. Epstein-Zin preferences are widely used to
solve equity premium puzzle in consumption-based asset pricing models because the preferences break the link between relative risk aversion (RRA) and intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES). Convex investment adjustment costs are frequently used in production1

A good definition of news-driven business cycles can be found in Bill and Saif (2014).
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based asset pricing models to generate high equity premiums by assuming high investment
adjustment costs. News shocks create risk for future investment growth due to investment
adjustment costs; thus news shocks generate risk premium for investment since the shocks
may or may not be realized in the future. Similarly, news shocks create risk for future
consumption growth, since the shocks may or may not be realized in the future. The risk
for future consumption growth increases the variation of intertemporal substitution thereby
increasing the equity premium. The theoretical model in this paper can therefore generate
desirable equity premium with Epstein-Zin preferences and convex investment adjustment
costs.
The preferences used in the theoretical model also feature a low wealth effect, which
is the core building block in generating news-driven business cycles. As demonstrated in
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), the labor supply has a strong positive response in the short
term when there is positive news about future productivity innovation if the wealth effect is
low enough. With low wealth effect, the labor supply rises before the realization of positive
news about future productivity innovation; output, consumption and investment all increase
caused by the growth of labor supply. As a result, a procyclical news-driven business cycle
is able to be produced under the mechanism introduced in the preferences.
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 describes the construction of the
model economy. Section 3.3 carries out a news shock experiment. Section 3.4 discusses the
implication of asset pricing generated by the theoretical model. Section 3.5 investigates the
roles of IES and convex investment adjustment costs in the theoretical model. Section 3.6
concludes the paper.

47

3.1.1

Literature Discussion

Since Prescott and Kydland (1982), the RBC model has succeeded in explaining some
salient facts of business cycles. Mehra and Prescott (1985) point out, however, that the
standard RBC model fails to explain asset returns and name this dilemma the equity premium puzzle. After the appearance of the equity premium puzzle, two strands of literature
emerged to solve the puzzle. One strand is called consumption-based asset pricing. By
manipulating preferences, economists explain asset returns in the exchange economy. Two
kinds of preferences are often used in consumption-based asset pricing literature. One is
called habit formation preferences and another one is called Epstein-Zin preferences. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) add a slow-moving external habit to the standard power utility
and explain a wide variety of dynamic asset pricing phenomena.2 Epstein and Zin (1989)
develop a class of recursive preferences that disentangle the relative risk aversion from the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and thus obtain desirable equity premium with reasonable relative risk aversion.3 The second strand of literature attempting to solve the puzzle
is called production-based asset pricing. Cochrane (1991) introduces the link between equity returns and investment returns, which builds the foundation for production-based asset
pricing. Jermann (1998) uses habit formation together with convex investment adjustment
costs to explain asset returns in a production economy.
The above discussion of asset pricing is, however, partial equilibrium analysis rather than
general equilibrium analysis. Rouwenhorst (1995) shows the difficulty of explaining asset returns in the RBC frame. Lettau and Uhlig (2000) demonstrate the even greater difficulty
using habit forming preferences in the RBC frame to explain asset returns. Boldrin, Chris2

Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) are pioneering works in the literature of habit formation preferences.
3
See Weil (1989) as the groundbreaking work in the literature of recursive preferences.
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tiano, and Fisher (2001) adopt a two-section model with restriction in factor flow to explain
the implication of pricing and facts of business cycles. Although their paper successfully
explains some implications of asset pricing, the volatility of risk-free rate in their paper is
unreasonably high. Currently, explaining asset returns and facts of business cycles in DSGE
models is still a challenge in the literature of macroeconomics and finance.
A strand of research known as news-driven business cycles, or expectation-driven business
cycles, is emerging in the literature on business cycles. The story of news-driven business
cycles is often stated in terms of economic agents increasing consumption, investment, and
labor supply if they receive good news about future productivity innovation, and thus experiencing an economic boom. If the good news fails to realize, economic agents decrease their
consumption, investment, and labor supply, thus experiencing an economic recession. The
initial discussion of news-driven business cycles is attributed to Pigou (1972). Beaudry and
Portier (2006), Barsky and Sims (2011), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012), and Basky, Basu,
and Lee (2014) use structural VAR with different identification strategies to demonstrate
the important role of news in driving business cycles. Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2007)
discuss how to generate news-driven business cycles within a neoclassical frame. Jaimovich
and Rebelo (2009) adopt preferences with low wealth effect, variable capital utilization rate,
and investment adjustment costs to attain news-driven business cycles in the RBC frame.
Dupor and Mekhari (2014) indicate two factors, complementary production frontier and
labor-leisure trade off, as keys in generating news-driven business cycles.
Economists currently do not explicitly consider asset returns in the course of their work
in the field of news-driven business cycles. In fact, economists’ models fail to explain asset
returns. Therefore, the question of whether we can explain asset returns in the news-driven
business cycles arises for consideration in the current literature. The most recent research relevant to this paper are Malkhozov and Tamoni (2015) and Malkhozov and Shamloo (2010).
These papers explain asset returns under news shocks. Two differences obtain between the
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two papers mentioned above and this paper. First, the above papers do not explicitly consider the possibility of generating news-driven business cycles in their models. Second, these
papers do not perform well in explaining asset returns in news-driven business cycles. This
paper is also relevant to the literature on asset pricing under long-run productivity risk,
defined as conditional anticipated news about future productivity. For example, although
Croce (2014) investigates asset returns under the long-run productivity risk, this study does
not explicitly consider news-driven business cycles in its model. In fact, Croce’s model
fails to generate news-driven business cycles under his parameter setting. In addition, the
specification of news shocks in Croce’s paper differs from this paper. The long-run productivity risk news are shocks to conditional expected productivity and are exposed to economic
agents with ex-post constant variation of aggregate productivity growth. The news shocks in
this paper are anticipated and have changeable variations of aggregate productivity growth
because of the noisy news setting.

3.2

Model Economy

Household

3.2.1

The model economy is populated by a large number of identical households. The utility
of the representative household is defined via a flow of composite goods,
1−γ
θ

et
Ut = {(1 − β)C

where θ =

1−γ
1
1− ψ

1

θ

1−γ θ 1−γ
+ β(Et Ut+1
) } ,

(3.1)

.

The parameter γ is relative risk aversion (RRA) and ψ is intertemporal elasticity of
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substitution (IES) for the representative household. β is the subjective discount rate. Et is
the expectation operator condition on the information at time t.
e is a composite good that consists of consumption and labor supply and has the following
C
form,
et = Ct − φXt Ntη .
C

(3.2)

η is the parameter governing the elasticity of labor supply. φ is the parameter associated
with the term of labor supply Nt . Ct is the current consumption of the representative agent.
The representative agent chooses her own labor supply in the optimal plan, which avoids the
negative consequence of the composite consumption.
Xt is a growth trend and has the following evolving form,

Xt+1 = gXt ,

(3.3)

where g is the gross growth rate.
The utility function is the typical representation of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil
(1989) preferences (Epstein-Zin preferences). If ψ >

1
,
γ

the representative agent is risk

averse. Epstein-Zin preferences are widely used in finance literature to achieve desirable
equity premium under reasonable RRA because the preferences break the link between RRA
and IES. Since the representative household is not only concerned with the expected discount
value of consumption flows but also with the variation of consumption flows, the Epstein-Zin
preferences react to the anticipated news shocks instead of the commonly used preferences.
As mentioned in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), two forms of utility functions are popular
in the literature of business cycles. One is used in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1983) and is
thus called KPR preferences. Another one is used in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman
(1988) and thus is called GHH preferences. Because of its success in generating news-driven
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business cycles, the preferences used in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) is now prevailing in
the literature of news-driven business cycles and thus called Jaimovich and Rebelo preferences. The Jaimovich and Rebelo preferences have been demonstrated as a useful format
in generating news-driven business cycles since their preferences have a strong positive response in labor supply when economic agents anticipate the future productivity improvement
contrasted with the KPR preferences. The utility function used in this paper contains the
feature of Jaimovich and Rebelo preferences by assuming the composite goods with the form
listed in Equation 3.2. The difference between the form of composite goods in this paper and
the setting in Jaimovich and Rebelo preferences is that the form of composite goods does
not include habit formation. Therefore, the assumption of composite goods in this paper
is essentially GHH preferences. The utility function in this paper, however, does not have
the problem implied by GHH preferences which lack a balance growth path required for the
computation by using the perturbation method. The utility form as shown in Equation 3.1
does have a balance growth path by associating the growth trend with labor supply. In summary, the utility function used in this paper possesses features that help in both generating
news-driven business cycles and attaining desirable equity premium.
The representative household has the following budget constraint,

f
et + Bt ≤ (1 + rte )St−1 + (1 + rt−1
)Bt−1 + Wt Nt .
St + C

(3.4)

St denotes the amount of equity shares that the representative household holds in the
model economy. rte is the real returns for per equity share at time t. The term of returns is
within expectation since the returns are not realized at time t when the equity shares are
issued at time t-1. Bt is the amount of bonds that the representative household issues in
the model economy. rf is the real returns for per bond share or the risk-free rate since the
rate is already known at time t. The final amount of bonds is zero in the model economy,
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because there is no willing to exchange bonds among households in the competitive equilibrium. Wt is the real wage for per hour worked and thus Wt Nt is the labor income for the
representative household. The budget constraint indicates that the representative household
obtains earning from holding equity shares, bond shares and supplying labor and spends it
in purchasing shares of equity, bonds and the composite consumption goods.

3.2.2

Firms

The households in the model economy own a large number of identical firms. The representative firm decides the amount of labor to employ and the amount of investment to make.
The representative firm maximizes its present value defined on a sequence of dividends,

M ax E0

∞
X
t=0

βt

λt
Dt ,
λ0

(3.5)

where β t λλ0t is the stochastic discount factor for the household who owns the firm.
Dt is the dividend of the representative firm at time t and is the output subtracts labor
costs and investment costs,
Dt = Yt − Wt Nt − It .

(3.6)

The representative firm uses the Cobb-Douglas production function with labor augmentation technology4 to produce the single final good,

Yt = Zt Ktα (Xt Nt )1−α .
4

(3.7)

This technology together with the preferences stated above are in line with the requirement to attain a
balanced growth path according to King, Plosser and Rebelo (1983).
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Kt and Nt are capital and labor used in the production process. α is the share of capital
in output. Xt is the exogenous growth process for the model economy and possesses the
evolving process stated in Equation 3.3.
Zt is the productivity factor in production and possesses the following AR (1) process,

log(Zt ) = ρlog(Zt−1 ) + t ,

(3.8)

where t are the productivity shocks with normal distribution of mean zero and standard
variance σz and ρ suggests the persistence of productivity shocks.
The capital accumulation for the representative firm is of the form often used in the
literature of production-based asset pricing such as Jermann (1998),

Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + G(

G(

It
)Kt
Kt

1
It
a1
It 1− 1−ξ
)=
)
+ a2 ,
1 (
Kt
1 − 1−ξ Kt

(3.9)

(3.10)

where δ is the capital depreciate rate and ξ is the elasticity of the investment capital ratio
with respect to Tobin’s q.

3.2.3

Market Equilibrium

Output is either consumed or invested in equilibrium. Therefore, the following equation
is established in the equilibrium,

Yt = Zt Ktα (Xt Nt )1−α = Ct + It .

(3.11)
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In equilibrium, labor supply equals labor demand and economic agents do not hold any
bonds in financial market.

3.3

News Shocks

There are two ways to model news shock according to Leeper and Walker (2013). One
form is the structure used in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). Another form is the structure
used in Leeper and Walker (2013). The difference between these two forms is the form used
in Leeper and Walker (2013) implies news shocks are time variant. This paper adopts the
structure of news shocks from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe(2012). Although the suggestion of
Leeper and Walker is beneficial in explaining the effects of anticipated public policy, this
paper aims at news-driven business cycles and thus adopts the definition of news shocks
as shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). The following part briefly introduces and
discusses the definition of news shocks in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012).
The productivity factor Zt is described in the Section 3.2.2 and listed here again to
facilitate the following discussion,

log(Zt ) = ρlog(Zt−1 ) + t .

News shocks are expressed in the form of productivity shocks t with j periods lags
according to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012),

log(Zt ) = ρlog(Zt−1 ) +

N
X

t−j .

(3.12)

j=0

If j = 0, then t are the surprise productivity shocks imposed on time t. If j > 0, for
example if j = 4, then t−4 is the news shocks of productivity innovation that is anticipated
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four-period-ahead by economic agents. t−j is assumed to be mean zero, standard variation
σ j and uncorrelated with each other across all time periods. Also, according to SchmittGrohe and Uribe (2012), the specification is a convenient way to express noisy news. Assume
economic agents receive the first news eight-period-ahead, the second news four-period-ahead
and the third news at time t. As a result, the news received four-period-ahead can be treated
as the revision of news received eight-period- ahead. And, news received at time t can be
treated as the sum revisions of news received four and eight periods ahead. Therefore, the
news received four and eight periods ahead represent noisy news of productivity innovation
at time t.

3.3.1

News-driven Business Cycles

I perform an experiment of procyclical news shocks in this section, which is similar to
the description in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).5 Assume that at time zero, the representative economic agent receives the news that there is 0.75% persistent increase in productivity
at time two and time four. The setting here is not the same as the setting described in
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012). Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2009) assume four-quarter-ahead news shocks and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) assume
four-quarter-ahead and eight-quarter-ahead news shocks. This paper assumes two-quarterahead news shocks and four-quarter-ahead news shocks. Economic agents cannot easily
anticipate news eight quarters ahead since eight-quarter-ahead news implies that economic
agents are able to anticipate events two years in the future. Economic agents can, however,
reasonably anticipate two-quarter-ahead news and four-quarter-ahead news.

5

Unlike the permanent increase in productivity as described in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), this paper
assumes that the news shocks are stationary and persistent.
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Table 3.1: Predictions for Quantities and Prices
Panel A: Benchmark Calibration
α

β

γ

δ

ψ

η

ρ

ξ

σz2

σz4

g

0.35

0.996

5

0.025

1.5

2

0.975

0.23

0.0075

0.0075

1.005

Panel B: Main Results
Data

Model

σ(∆y)(%)

3.56 (0.65)

3.13

σ(∆c)/σ(∆y)

0.71 (0.05)

1.33

σ(∆i)/σ(∆y)

4.49 (0.61)

0.30

LEV
E[rex,t+1
](%)

4.71 (2.25)

3.96

σ(q)

0.29 (0.05)

0.32

LEV
)(%)
σ(rex,t+1

20.89 (2.21)

13.76

E[rtf ](%)

0.65 (0.38)

1.01

σ(rtf )(%)

1.86 (0.32)

2.18

Note: The data is collected from Panel B Table 3 in Croce (2014).
The data in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 have the same source.
The stand deviations from mean values are listed in the brace.
The theoretical model is simulated by Dynare++ for 320 quarters to match the data.

To simulate the artificial model under the news shocks, this paper uses the parameters
listed in Panel A of Table 3.1. α is the capital output ratio and its value used here is collected from Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). β is the subjective discount rate. The discount
rate should be high enough to make sure the artificial model gets a desirable risk-free rate.
The discount rate is set to 0.996, which is the value used in Croce (2014). γ is the coefficient
of risk aversion. How to attain a desirable equity premium under reasonable γ used to be
the hot topic in the literature of asset pricing. This paper sets γ = 5, which is a fairly low
value that is used in the literature of asset pricing. ρ indicates the persistence of productivity
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shocks. This paper sets ρ = 0.975 and ensures the productivity shocks are persistent enough
to capture the change of technological innovation. σz2 and σz4 are the variation of anticipated
productivity shocks and set to 0.75% as demonstrated in the literature of business cycles. g
is the gross growth rate on the quarterly basis. The value of 1.005 means that the quarterly
net growth rate is 0.5% and thus the annual net growth rate is 2%, which is the approximate
annual net growth rate as shown in the U.S. time series. ξ is the elasticity described in the
section 3.2.2. To achieve the desirable equity premium discussed in the following section, ξ is
set to 0.23, the value is used in Jermann (1998) and different from Croce (2014). The value
of δ is common used in the literature of business cycles. η is the parameter of Frisch labor
supply elasticity. The higher value of η implies weaker positive response of labor supply in
short term as demonstrated in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). Two parameters a1 and a2
are not listed in the Panel A of Table 3.1. The two parameters are calculated to match the
common used capital accumulation equation at the steady state.
The definition of procyclical news-driven business cycle is that output, consumption,
investment and labor supply increase if there is an anticipated improvement of future productivity according to Dupora and Saif (2014). Figure 3.1 shows the impulse responses of
consumption, output, labor supply and investment under two-period-ahead news shocks.
From Figure 3.1, we observe that consumption, output, labor supply and investment all
rise prior to the realization of news shocks and continue rising after the news shocks are
realized. Although there is a slight decrease in consumption in a very short period of time
before the news shocks are realized, this decrease does not influence the whole dynamics of
consumption growth. Figure 3.2 presents the impulse responses of the four macroeconomic
variables under four-period-ahead news shocks. The same happens to the four macroeconomic variables prior to the realization of the news shocks. Compared to the definition of
Dupora and Saif (2014), the theoretical model in this paper is able to produce news-driven
business cycles. The Panel B of Table 3.1 shows the news shocks can explain more 70%
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variation of output fluctuations, which is demonstrated by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012).
The ratio of standard variation (std) of consumption over std of output is higher than the
value shown in the data. The ratio of std of investment over std of output is too low to
match the data. The reason that these two unsatisfactory results happen is due to the low
value of ξ and thus the high investment adjustment costs, which fail to generate the high
volatility of investment. Over all, the theoretical model replicates the facts of news driven
business cycles by observing the impulse responses shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.1: Two-Quarter-Ahead News Shocks

(a) Consumption

(b) Output

(c) Labor Supply

(d) Investment
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Figure 3.2: Four-Quarter-Ahead News Shocks

(a) Consumption

(b) Output

(c) Labor Supply

(d) Investment

3.4

Asset Pricing

This section discusses asset returns implied by the theoretical model under news-driven
business cycles. To better evaluate the performance of the artificial model, formulas of equity
returns, risk-free rate are derived as follows,

mt = β ∗ (

e
ct 1−γ −1 vt1−γ 1− 1
) θ ( 1−γ ) θ
e
ct−1
Evt+1

(3.13)
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1 + rtf =

1
,
mt

(3.14)

where mt is the stochastic discount factor and rtf is the real risk-free rate.
This paper uses Equation 3.15 that is suggested in Cochrane (1991) to compute the equity
returns,
1+

e
rt+1


=

gk (t + 1)
fk (t + 1) +
gi (t + 1)


gi (t).

(3.15)

e
is the expected real equity returns at time t+1. fk (t + 1) is the real returns for
rt+1

capital at time t+1. gk (t + 1) is the partial derivative of the Equation 3.9 with respect to
capital at time t+1. And gi (t + 1), gi (t) are the partial derivatives of the Equation 3.9 with
respect to investment at time t+1 and time t.
By using Equation 3.15, the following formula of equity returns is derived based on the
assumption in the theoretical model,

1+

e
rt+1

=

α kyt+1
+ (1 − δ + G( kit+1
))qt+1 −
t+1
t+1
qt

qt =

1
G0 ( kitt )

,

it+1
kt+1

(3.16)

(3.17)

e
where rt+1
is the real returns expected at time t, G(·) is the function listed in the Equa-

tion 3.10 and G0 (·) is the partial derivative of the Equation 3.10 with respect to investment.
The q is explained as the price of new capital or the Tobin’s q. By simply manipulating
the Equation 3.10, we find ξ is the elasticity of

it
kt

with respect to q, which is stated in

section 3.2.2.
This paper considers the leverage that is discussed in Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher
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(1997) to explain asset returns in the data.6 This paper adopts the formula and explanation
used in Croce (2014),
LEV
rex,t+1
= φlev (rt+1 − rtf ) + dt+1 .

(3.18)

According to Croce (2014), the leverage φlev is two and dt is i.i.d normal with mean zero
and standard deviation 6.5% on annually basis. The setting is also supported by Rauh and
Sufi (2012) and Bansal and Yaron (2004).

3.4.1

Implication of Asset Pricing

The results of asset returns for the theoretical model are listed in the Panel B of Table 3.1.
The excess returns is as sizable as shown in the data, considering the standard deviation
of the mean equity premium in the data. The result of excess returns is promising since
few works can attain it at business cycle frequency as documented in the literature. The
mechanism that generates high risk premium can be illustrated by the following well known
formula,
E(rt+1 − rtf ) = −cov(mt+1 , rt+1 ).

(3.19)

From this formula, we know a negative relationship between mt and rt is necessary
to generate positive risk premium. By observing the impulse responses of asset returns and
stochastic discount factor shown in Figure 3.3, we find a strong negative relationship between
asset returns and stochastic discount factor. Therefore, the theoretical model in this paper
is able to achieve high equity premium as shown in the data.
The risk-free rate and its volatility are as sizable as those shown in the data. These
two values are close to the upper bounder of the values listed in the data. The results of
d
The levered excess returns is: Rt+1
− Rtf = (Rt+1 − Rtf )(1 +
ratio of the firm.
6

B
S ),

where B/S is the average debt-share
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risk-free rate and its volatility are promising in the literature too. Jermann (1998) achieves
desirable equity premium, but obtains unreasonable high volatility of risk-free rate. Boldrin,
Christiano and Fisher (2001) is one of the most prominent works in addressing asset returns
at business cycle frequency, however, they attain unreasonable high volatility of risk-free rate
too.
Although the results of equity premium and risk-free rate are very promising, the returns
volatility puzzle remains unexplained in the theoretical model. According to Croce (2014),
there is a relative trade off between the volatility of the quantities and the volatility of asset
returns. The higher the investment adjustment costs, the lower the volatility of quantities
but the higher the volatility of asset returns. The lower the investment adjustment costs,
the higher the volatility of quantities but the lower the volatility of asset returns. This paper
chooses the high investment adjustment costs to explain asset returns and thus generates
the low volatility of investment as shown in Section 3.3.1.
Figure 3.3 shows the impulse responses of risk-free rate, asset returns, stochastic discount
factor and q under two-period-ahead news shocks. The risk-free rate decreases before the
news shocks are realized and returns to its steady state after the news shocks decay as time
passes. When facing an anticipated positive productivity improvement, the economic agents
choose to increase consumption for the wealth effect brought by the future growth of output.
Thus, the risk-free rate needs to decrease to coincide with the growth of consumption. Asset
returns increase before the news shocks are realized, reach a summit as the news shocks
are realized and decease as the news shocks dissipate. Facing a positive news about future
productivity innovation, the demand for future investment increases and thus the future
investment capital ratio will increase, which brings higher returns for investment as shown
in Cochrane (1991). q, the price of capital, increases before the news shocks are realized and
keep rising after the news shocks are realized too. Because the existence of adjustment costs
for capital accumulation, the supply curve of capital is not perfectly flexible. As a result,
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the price of capital, q, increases as the economy increases aggregate investment before or
after the news shocks are realized. The model also captures the volatility of q as shown in
Table 3.1. As we know, the standard RBC model fails to generate variation of q, and thus
fails to obtain the equity premium. This paper achieves desirable q by assuming the low
investment adjustment costs. Contrasting to Croce (2014), the volatility of q exactly match
the data, but the q in Croce (2014) is out the range of data.
Figure 3.3: Responses of Asset Prices under News Shocks (Two-Quarter-Ahead)

(a) Risk Free Rate

(b) Return

(c) Stochastic Discount Factor(m)

(d) q
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3.5

Robust Analysis

This section examines the roles of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and
convex investment adjustment costs in generating news-business cycles and explaining asset
returns.

3.5.1

Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution

The IES is the key parameter in generating news-driven business cycles. A lower IES
means a lower substitution between consumption flows, which makes economic agents be
reluctant to adjust consumption. Therefore, the optimal reaction for economic agents is to
change investment facing the news shocks, which may crowd out investment if the increase
of output is not high enough to compensate the increase of consumption. As shown in Figure 3.4 with the case ψ = 0.5, consumption increases before the news shocks are realized and
keeps rising after the news shocks are realized. The output, however, fails to compensate for
the consumption increase and thus investment falls before the news shocks are realized. On
the other hand, a higher IES also incurs trouble in generating news-driven business cycles. A
higher IES implies high substitution between consumption flows. Therefore, economic agents
are willing to adjust their consumption facing the news shocks. As shown in Figure 3.4 with
case ψ = 2 and ψ = 3, consumption decreases before the news shocks are realized. Yet the
dynamics of the macroeconomic variables do not change when facing the news shocks with
ψ > 1. Therefore, this paper chooses the value of ψ to best explain asset returns as in the
benchmark calibration.
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Figure 3.4: News Shocks under Different ψ (Two-Quarter-Ahead)

(a) Consumption

(b) Output

(c) Labor Supply

(d) Investment

The IES also plays an important role in explaining asset returns. Bansal and Yaron
(2004) demonstrates an IES larger than one is important to achieve a low risk-free rate.
As shown in Table 3.2, an IES less than one generates unreasonable high risk-free rate and
high volatility of risk-free rate. An IES with value 2 or 3 can match the mean value of riskfree rate in the data, however, they generates unreasonable high volatility of risk-free rate
too. As shown in table 3.2, the volatility of risk-free rapidly increases with the increment of
IES. Higher IES means higher substitution between consumption flows and thus induces the

66
higher variance of risk-free rate. These findings also coincide with the relationship between
risk-free rate and consumption documented in the financial literature such as Croce (2014).
Table 3.2: Predictions for Quantities and Prices under Different ψ
ψ = 0.5 ψ = 1.5

ψ=2

ψ=3

Data

Model

Model

Model

model

σ(∆y)(%)

3.56 (0.65)

3.11

3.13

3.14

3.12

σ(∆c)/σ(∆y)

0.71 (0.05)

1.16

1.33

1.36

1.41

σ(∆i)/σ(∆y)

4.49 (0.61)

0.55

0.30

0.26

0.23

LEV
](%)
E[rex,t+1

4.71 (2.25)

3.63

3.96

4.02

3.99

LEV
)(%)
σ(rex,t+1

20.89 (2.21)

8.86

13.76

14.94

16.24

σ(q)

0.29 (0.05)

0.43

0.32

0.30

0.27

E[rtf ](%)

0.65 (0.38)

3.94

1.01

0.68

0.41

σ(rtf )(%)

1.86 (0.32)

5.02

2.18

3.44

4.82

3.5.2

Convex Investment Adjustment Costs

As stated in the Section 3.4.1, the parameter ξ determines the volatility of investment.
A lower value of ξ will smooth the path of investment since the higher investment adjustment costs. Therefore, the optimal reaction for economic agents facing the news shocks is to
increase the investment and decrease consumption before the news shocks are realized given
the positive news of future productivity innovation. The investment increases before the
news shocks are realized and continues rising after the news shocks are realized, as shown in
the case with ξ = 0.23 in Figure 3.5. However, a lower value of ξ brings too much investment,
which may crowd out consumption in the short term. As shown in Figure 3.5, consumption
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decreases in a very short term before the news shocks are realized in the case with ξ = 0.23.
However, the decrease of consumption is not severe enough to influence the positive response
of consumption under the positive news shocks. A higher value of ξ does not smooth the
path of investment since the low investment adjustment costs. Therefore, given the positive
news about future productivity innovation, the optimal reaction for economic agents facing
news shocks is to increase consumption and decrease investment before the news shocks are
realized. Investment falls before the news shocks are realized in short term as shown in the
case with ξ = 7 in Figure 3.5. However, the decrease of investment in the case of ξ = 7 is
not severe since the investment adjustment costs are not too high to generate completely
negative responses of investment before the news shocks are realized. Over all, the value of
ξ does not influence the generation of news-driven business cycles to a great degree in the
value range listed in comparison. Therefore, this paper chooses the value of ξ to best explain
asset returns.
The parameter ξ is the most important factor in explaining asset returns since it controls
the real friction in the production economy as stated in Section 3.4.1. A lower value of ξ
increases the investment adjustment costs and smooths the path of investment. Therefore,
the variation of intertemporal substitution rises, which increases the equity premium. Also,
the higher investment adjustment costs combined with the news shocks create higher risk for
future investment, which also increases the equity premium. Table 3.3 shows the simulation
results of the theoretical model under three values of ξ that are arranged from low to high.
ξ = 0.23 is the value used in this paper and in Jermann (1998) and ξ = 7 is the value used in
Croce (2014). All three values are able to attain sizable equity premium in the simulation if
we consider the standard deviation listed in the brace for the mean value of equity premium.
Only the low value of ξ, however, generates comparative higher volatility of excess returns.
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Figure 3.5: News Shocks under Different ξ (Two-Quarter-Ahead)

(a) Consumption

(b) Output

(c) Labor Supply

(d) Investment

As stated in Section 3.4.1, there is a trade-off between the volatility of quantities and
the volatility of asset returns. A lower value of ξ is able to create higher volatility of asset
returns but low volatility of investment. Therefore, the ratio of the standard deviation (std)
of consumption over the std of output is pretty low for ξ = 0.23. The risk-free rate keeps
almost constant along with the change of investment adjustment costs in this paper, which
is different from the result reached in Croce (2014). The volatility of risk-free rate, however,
decreases because economics agents choose to adjust investment to optimize their reaction
when facing the news shocks.
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Table 3.3: Predictions for Quantities and Prices under Different ξ
ξ = 0.23

ξ=4

ξ=7

Data

Model

Model

Model

σ(∆y)(%)

3.56 (0.65)

3.13

3.16

3.17

σ(∆c)/σ(∆y)

0.71 (0.05)

1.33

0.81

0.72

σ(∆i)/σ(∆y)

4.49 (0.61)

0.30

1.43

1.62

LEV
](%)
E[rex,t+1

4.71 (2.25)

3.96

3.98

4.01

LEV
σ(rex,t+1
)(%)

20.89 (2.21)

13.76

7.78

7.23

σ(q)

0.29 (0.05)

0.32

0.07

0.04

E[rtf ](%)

0.65 (0.38)

1.01

0.98

0.99

σ(rtf )(%)

1.86 (0.32)

2.18

0.83

0.62

3.6

Conclusion

This paper attempts to explain asset returns and the facts of business cycles under newsdriven business cycles in a DSGE model. The theoretical model in this paper successfully
achieves equity premium, risk free fate under news-driven business cycles. The theoretical
model adopts Epstein-Zin preferences with low wealth effect and convex investment adjustment costs to explain asset returns and the facts of news-driven business cycles. Low wealth
effect embedded in the preferences helps to generate a positive response of labor supply and
thus news-driven business cycles when facing positive news about future productivity innovation. News shocks create a risk channel for consumption growth since the news shocks
may or may not be realized. Combined with convex adjustment costs, news shocks also
create risk for future investment, which also brings an equity premium. Therefore, the two
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channels together generate an equity premium as sizable as that found in the historic data.
By explaining asset returns under news-driven business cycles, this paper contributes to the
literature of news-driven business cycles and asset pricing.

CHAPTER 4
AGGREGATE LABOR MARKET FLUCTUATIONS

4.1

Introduction

The relationship between aggregate hours worked and average productivity has been
considered the touchstone in macroeconomics since Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1939). There
are two facts about the relationship in the literature of real business cycle (RBC). First,
aggregate hours worked are more volatile than average productivity. The ratio of standard
deviation (std) of aggregate hours worked over std of average productivity is much greater
N
> 1).1 Second, the correlation between aggregate hours worked and average
than one ( σσay

productivity (corr(N, ay)) is a small positive number.2
The standard RBC model, described in Section 4.2.1, which achieves some reasonable
conclusions of economic fluctuations fails to capture these two facts. The

σN
σay

is less than one

and the corr(N, ay) is close to one in the standard RBC model. Therefore, many studies have
attempted to solve this puzzle through establishing a correct relationship between aggregate
hours worked and average productivity in the RBC frame. Kydland and Prescott (1982)
introduce the time non-separable preferences into the standard RBC model and obtain the
correct value of

σN
.
σay

The representative agent of time non-separable preferences cares about

not only current leisure, but also the aggregate leisure from past periods to the current
1

This paper denotes N as the aggregate hours worked and ay as the average productivity. σ defines the
standard deviation of a random variable and corr defines the correlation between two random variables.
2
The discussion about the correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity has had
a long history in the literature beginning with Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1939). This paper accepts the
conclusion in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), in which the correlation between aggregate hours worked
and average productivity is 0.44.
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period. Therefore, the representative agent is willing to substitute by working more during
some periods and less during other periods. As a result, the variation of aggregate hours
worked is more volatile than the variation of it in the standard RBC model. Hansen (1985)
introduces indivisible labor into the standard RBC model and also attains the reasonable
value of

σN
σay

too. Hansen (1985) treats all labor supply as a choice of working or not working.

This treatment is so-called indivisible labor in the literature. Indivisible labor supply implies
all fluctuations of labor input are due to changes in the number of employed workers but not
changes in hours worked. Therefore, the variation of aggregate hours worked is also higher
than the variation of aggregate hours worked in the standard RBC model. The success of
these two models essentially relies on a higher elasticity of the labor supply contrasted with
the standard RBC model. With this higher elasticity of labor supply, their models are able
to gain the reasonable value of

σN
σay

since the labor supply fluctuates more widely in their

models than the standard RBC model.
There is, however, a significant weak point in the two extensive RBC models above.
Aggregate hours worked and average productivity are highly correlated with each other in
these two models. The structure of the standard RBC model and extensive RBC model
implies the high correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity. Only
one kind of shocks, technological shocks, shows in these models. The technological shocks
shift aggregate labor demand while keeping the aggregate labor supply stable. Therefore,
average productivity change is the same as the change of aggregate hours worked, which
produces the high correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity.
To solve the dilemma in Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985), different
shocks are introduced by economists in the RBC literature. Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright
(1991) introduce home production shocks and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) introduce
government spending shocks into the standard RBC model. Essentially, home production
shocks and government spending shocks are designed to shift the aggregate labor supply. For
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government spending shocks, the change of government spending changes the wealth of the
economic agents and thus induces the economic agent to change their labor supply. During
the business cycles, the combination of government spending shocks and technological shocks
simultaneously shift aggregate labor supply and aggregate labor demand. As a result, the
correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity in the model depends
on the magnitude of the two shocks. As for home production shocks, the technological shocks
to home production change the labor supply from market production to home production
since the labor supply to market and the labor supply to home production is replaceable
in family activities. Also, the correlation between aggregate hours worked and average
productivity in the model depends on the magnitude of the two shocks too.
The design of the two kinds of shocks in the standard RBC model effectively explains the
data on the fluctuations of aggregate labor market during the business cycles as illustrated by
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). This paper,
however, considers the possibility that the data on the fluctuations of aggregate labor market
can be replicated by technological shocks alone. This answer is reinforced if we incorporate
efficient leisure, as first introduced by Hercowitz and Sampson (1991), into a family labor
supply model under the RBC frame. Based on the above analysis, if both aggregate labor
supply and aggregate labor demand are shifted during the business cycles, it is possible to
reduce the high correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity and
simultaneously increase the variation of aggregate hours worked. With efficient leisure for
family members, technological shocks create two effects. One effect is to shift the aggregate
labor demand curve and another effect is to shift the aggregate labor supply curve. In
combining these two effects, this paper generates favorable relationship between aggregate
hours worked and average productivity. This paper only appears similar to the work of
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991): ultimately, this paper solves the puzzle of the
standard RBC model using only technological shocks and essentially accommodating the
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model of Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991).
The paper is divided into four sections. Section 4.2 analyzes the underlying mechanism
of labor market fluctuations in business cycles. Section 4.3 presents an theoretical model
featuring efficient leisure which effectively explain the relationship between aggregate hours
worked and average productivity. Section 4.4 provides the brief conclusion.

4.2

4.2.1

An Analytic Explanation

Aggregate Labor Supply Elasticity

I briefly introduce a standard RBC model as the benchmark to help the following discussion. The same notations and equations used in this section are defined in details.
The artificial economy consists of identical households with infinite life. The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility defined on the sequence of consumption and
leisure,
max E0

∞
X

β t U (Ct , Lt ).

(4.1)

t=0

Ct is the current consumption and Lt is the current leisure. E0 is the conditional operator
based on the information at time zero. β is the subjective discount rate. The utility function is concave and twice differentiable to ensure the existence of a unique maximal utility.
Consumption and leisure are normal goods, thus Uc > 0, UL > 0, Ucc < 0, ULL < 0.
Households supply labor and rent capital to firms in the model economy. The following
budget constraint applies to the model’s representative family,

Ct + St = rt Kt + Wt Nt

(4.2)
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Lt + Nt = 1.

(4.3)

St is the total saving. rt is the real returns for capital Kt . Wt is the real wage for supplying labor Nt . The time endowment of the representative household is normalized to one.
The model economy contains many identical firms owned by the households. The representative firm produces single and perishable goods used for consumption or investment.
The representative firm has the following Cobb-Douglas production function,

Yt = F (At , Nt , Kt ) = At Ktα Nt1−α ,

(4.4)

where α is the capital output ratio.
At is exogenous technological factor in production. Technological factor evolves as follows,

log(At ) = ρlog(At−1 ) + t ,

(4.5)

where ρ is the coefficient of the auto-regression and implies the persistence of technological
shocks and t is an i.i.d process with normal distribution of mean zero and standard deviation
σe .
The capital accumulation in the model economy is as follows,

Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt ,

(4.6)

where δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Based on the above assumption, the social planner’s first order conditions are derived as
follows,
α−1 1−α
UC,t = βEt [UC,t+1 αAt+1 kt+1
Nt+1 + (1 − δ)]

(4.7)
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UL,t = UC,t (1 − α)At ktα Nt−α ,

(4.8)

where UC,t defines the partial derivative of utility function with respect to C at time t and
UL,t defines the partial derivative of utility function with respect to L at time t.
These two first order conditions and other auxiliary conditions determine the entire dynamics of the standard RBC model. Subsequently, the standard RBC model fails to generate
the reasonable value of

σN
σay

because of the low elasticity of aggregate labor supply as men-

tioned in Section 4.1. The explicit calculation is carried out in the following details.
The utility function used in the standard RBC model generally has the log-log form with
respect to consumption and leisure,

U (C, L) = logCt + θlogLt .

(4.9)

The commonly used Frisch labor supply elasticity in the literature of labor economics is
defined as follows,
UN

η=

N [UN N −

2
UCN
]
UCC

,

(4.10)

where UN is the first derivative of utility function with respect to N and other derivatives
have the similar explanations.
Using Equation 4.9 and 4.10, the Frisch labor supply elasticity for the standard RBC
model is derived as follows,
η1 =

1 − Nt
.
Nt

(4.11)

The Frisch labor supply elasticity is two in the standard RBC model since economists
usually calibrate the standard RBC model with N = 1/3 at steady state. The elasticity
of aggregate labor supply is much higher than the elasticity estimated from micro data;
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however, it still fails to generate the right value of

σN
.
σay

After calibration with common

parameters, listed in the Section 4.3, in the RBC literature, the value of

σN
σay

is less than one.

In contrast to the standard RBC model, Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen (1985)
are able to attain the desirable value of

σN
σay

is because the utility functions used in these

two studies implied higher elasticity of aggregate labor supply. The utility function used in
Kydland and Prescott (1982) has the same general form as that of the standard RBC model,
but with different specification in its details,

U (C, L) = logCt + θlog

∞
X

ai lt−i ,

(4.12)

i=0

where ai+1 = (1 − η)ai and 0 < η < 1.
The formula of Frisch labor supply elasticity is derived for Kydland and Prescott (1982)
as follows,
2

η =

P∞

i=0

ai (1 − Nt−i )
.
a0 Nt

(4.13)

Thus, the Frisch labor supply elasticity is large enough to generate higher variation of
aggregate hours worked contrasted to the standard RBC model if the weight for current
leisure a0 is small enough. For Hansen (1985), the utility function is as follows,

U (C, L) = logCt − θNt .

(4.14)

The Frisch labor supply elasticity advances to infinity by simple calculation. Thus Hansen
(1985) generates higher variation of aggregate hours worked contrasted to the standard RBC
model.
With high elasticity of aggregate labor supply , Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Hansen
(1985) achieve a higher variation of aggregate hours worked and thus the desirable value of
σN
.
σay

But, their models and the standard RBC model only have technological shocks that
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only shift the aggregate labor demand curve, and their models and the standard RBC model
thus produce high correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity.
The standard RBC model that has the same structure with extensive RBC model is a good
example to illustrate this argument.
Equation 4.4 and the competitive economy imply the real wage in the standard RBC
model is,
Wt = (1 − α)At ktα Nt−α .

(4.15)

A log-linearization approximation3 of Equation 4.11 is as follows,

Ŵt = Ât + αk̂t − αN̂t ,

(4.16)

where a variable with hat is defined as the percentage deviation from its steady state.
Equation 4.16 is the aggregate labor demand function because it involves a positive term
of real wage on the left-hand side and a negative term of aggregate hours worked on the
right-hand side. Ât is the interception term and the shift term since technological shocks
are exogenous. If there is a technological shock, Ât changes and thus the aggregate labor
demand shifts.
By using Equations 4.8 and 4.9, we can derive the aggregate labor supply curve as follows,

Ŵt =

N
N̂t + Ĉt .
1−N

(4.17)

Equation 4.17 is the aggregate labor supply function because the positive terms of real
wage and aggregate hours worked are set on both sides. Ĉt is considered as the wealth effect.
There is no shift term involved in the aggregate labor supply function. Since the standard
RBC model has the same structure as the extensive RBC model, Equations 4.16 and 4.17
3

A good discussion about the log-linearization method is presented in Campbell (1994).
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are the representative aggregate labor demand function and aggregate labor supply function
for these models. The aggregate labor supply curve, however, is flatter in the extensive RBC
model than in the standard RBC model. The slope of the aggregate labor supply curve is
simply the reverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Thus, the higher the labor supply
elasticity, the lower the slope for the aggregate labor supply curve, and the flatter the curve.
Therefore, technological shocks only change the aggregate labor demand while maintaining the stability of the aggregate labor supply. If the aggregate labor supply curve is flatter,
the aggregate hours worked are more volatile. The aggregate hours worked and average productivity, however, move in the same direction, which generates the high correlation between
aggregate hours worked and average productivity.

Figure 4.1: Labor Supply Elasticity: Standard RBC Model Vs Extensive RBC Model
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The discussion in this section is apt to be illustrated in a graph of labor demand and supply. Figure 4.1 shows the variation of aggregate hours worked is higher in the extensive RBC
model than the standard RBC model.4 Figure 4.1 also shows the tight relationship between
aggregate hours worked and average productivity. As shown in Figure 4.1, average productivity increases when the aggregate hour worked increases under a positive technological
shock.

4.2.2

Labor Demand and Supply

Based on the discussion in the section 4.2.1, there is one way to relieve the tight correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity. The solution is to introduce
another kind of shocks that shifts the aggregate labor supply curve. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) provide an example of this idea. I have briefly discussed the principle why the
effectiveness of government spending shocks in Section 4.1. Here I use log-linearization to
show the explicit mechanism.
There are no significant differences between preferences, capital dynamics, and technological shocks in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) as contrasted to the standard RBC model.
The change is shown in the economic constraint by adding the government spending term
and the government spending shocks,

4

Ct + It + Gt = Yt

(4.18)

logGt = ρg logGt−1 + µt .

(4.19)

W(wage) is proportional to the average productivity, because the definition of average productivity is
output over aggregate hours worked.
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Equations 4.18 and 4.19 imply that government spending shocks change the income of
economic agents and simultaneously change the labor supply of economic agents according
to the wealth effects, if we plug in the derived percentage deviation of consumption implied
by Equations 4.18 and 4.19. Thus, government spending shocks are exogenous shocks that
shift the aggregate labor supply curve according to Equation 4.17. As a result, the tight
correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity is alleviated by the
shifted aggregate labor supply curve. Also, the aggregate hours worked fluctuates more with
the sifted aggregate labor supply curve.
Another example is Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991). The preferences used in
their paper maintain the same general form of Equation 4.9; however, the home production
elements are incorporated into consumption and leisure,
1

e
e e
Ct = [aCM
t + (1 − a)CHt ]

(4.20)

Lt = 1 − NM t − NHt ,

(4.21)

where M defines market and H defines household.
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) thus have two production functions for household
goods and market goods,
α1
1−α1
YM t = ZM t KM
t NM t

(4.22)

α2 1−α2
YHt = ZHt KHt
NM t .

(4.23)
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There are also two shocks associated with market production technology ZM t and household production technology ZHt ,

ZM t = ρM t ZM t−1 + M t

(4.24)

ZHt = ρHt ZHt−1 + Ht .

(4.25)

To complete the model, the budget constraints in their model are as follows,

CM t + It = YM t

(4.26)

CHt = YHt .

(4.27)

Solving the social planner’s question and taking log-linearization for the first order conditions of labor, the aggregate labor supply curve for household goods and market goods are
derived as follows,
NM
NH
NˆM t +
NˆHt = WˆM t + λ̂t
1 − NM − NH
1 − NM − NH

(4.28)

NM
NH
NˆM t +
NˆHt = WˆHt + ηˆt ,
1 − NM − NH
1 − NM − NH

(4.29)

where λt and ηt are Lagrange multipliers associated with the two constraints, which imply
the wealth effect.
From Equations 4.28 and 4.29, we know aggregate labor supply for market goods and
household goods is replaceable. Thus, any technological shocks happen in one market shift
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aggregate labor supply curve in another market. With the shifting aggregate labor supply
curve, the tight correlation between aggregate hours worked and average productivity in
each market is alleviated as it is in the model of government spending shocks. Again, two
shocks also bring higher fluctuations of aggregate hours worked.

Figure 4.2: Movement of Labor Supply and Labor Demand

Figure 4.2 shows an extreme example of simultaneously shifting labor supply and labor
demand. From Figure 4.2, we observe that the high correlation between aggregate hours
worked and average productivity is mitigated by shifting the aggregate labor supply curve.
Furthermore, the aggregate hours worked varies more in this situation.
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4.3

Family Labor Supply Model

4.3.1

Model Assumption

The artificial economy consists of infinite identical families. The representative family
is composed of one married man (husband) and one married woman (wife). In the representative family, both husband and wife participate in the job market, i.e., they both have
some market labor supply, whether part-time or full-time.5 Let Nth denote the hours that
the husband utilizes in a market job at period t, and Lht is the leisure that he enjoys after
work. Let Ntw denote hours that the wife utilizes in a market job at period t and Lw
t is the
leisure that she enjoys after work. Husband and wife both have the following natural time
restrictions,
Nth + Lht = 1

(4.30)

Ntw + Lw
t = 1.

(4.31)

The utility of the representative family derives from total family consumption and leisure
from both husband and wife. This paper assumes husband and wife are concerned with the
family consumption as a whole. The assumption may bear some critiques. However, if
individual consumption is incorporated, then the calibration of different weights for individ5

The assumption here is not necessary to obtain the reasonable relationship between aggregate hours
worked and average productivity. Even a single family member with efficient leisure can generate the
desirable results. However, the parameters used for calibration in the single-family-member model are not
reasonable when contrasted with the family model of two members.
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ual consumption requires individual consumption data. This data are not available in the
current literature or database. The utility function has the following general form,

U = U (C, Lh , Lw ).

(4.32)

The property of the utility function follows standard assumption in the economic theory.
The function is concave and twice differentiable to ensure the existence of a maximal utility. Consumption and leisure for both husband and wife are normal goods, thus there are
Uc > 0, UL > 0, Ucc < 0, ULL < 0.
Families own firms, supply labor and rent capital to firms in the economy. The representative family has the following budget constraint,

Ct + Kt+1 = rt Kt + Wth Nth + Wtw Ntw + (1 − δ)Kt ,

(4.33)

where δ is the depreciation rate of capital stock.
Ct is the total family consumption. Kt is capital stock at period t, built from the
investment of the representative firm. rt is the rental price for capital. Wth is the market
wage for the husband, and Wtw is the market wage for the wife.
The economy contains an infinite number of identical firms owned by families. The
representative firm produces single and perishable consumption goods that are also used as
investment goods with no transfer cost. The following is the production function used in
this paper,
Yt = F (Kt , Nth , Ntw ) = At Ktα [Gt (Nth + Ntw )]1−α ,

(4.34)

where α is the capital output ratio.
The production function is the Cobb-Douglas production function commonly used in
the literature. This paper differs through dividing the total labor supply into husband and
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wife. Labor supply for the husband and wife are in perfect substitution because of using
the additive form. This production function using labor augmented technology guarantees
a balance growth path which is necessary for the research of business cycles. Gt (Nth + Ntw )
in this production form is so called effective labor.
At is the technological factor in production. t are the technological shocks and the
only driven force for fluctuations in the economy. The following procedure illustrates the
technological shocks,
log(At+1 ) = ρlog(At ) + t+1 ,

(4.35)

where ρ is the coefficient of auto-regression, and 0 < ρ < 1 and t is an i.i.d process with
normal distribution of N (0, σe2 ).
Gt is the determinant growth component in production and follows the process as listed
below,
Gt+1 = gGt .

(4.36)

Gt is assumed to expand at a constant rate g, and g > 1. g is the annul gross growth
rate. The capital accumulation in the economy has the following procedure,

Kt+1 = It + (1 − δ)Kt .

(4.37)

Define Nt as the aggregate hours worked of the representative family,
Nt = Nth + Ntw .

(4.38)
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Define the average productivity6 (ay) as follows,

ayt =

4.3.2

Yt
.
Nt

(4.39)

Model Solution

To provide a quantitative solution to this artificial model, a specific utility function must
be presented. This paper uses the following utility function form7 ,

U (Ct , Lht , Lw
t ) =

1−γw
Z 1−σ (Lht )1−γh
Z 1−σ (Lw
Ct1−σ
t )
+ θh t
+ θw t
,
1−σ
1 − γh
1 − γw

(4.40)

where γh and γw respectively denote the coefficients of labor supply elasticity of husband
and wife and σ denotes the risk aversion for total family consumption.
The utility function is additively separable in the form of CRRA (constant relative risk
aversion). If σ is not equal to one, then the utility function meets the requirement of balance
growth path that is suggested by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
Zt = Gt At captures the efficient leisure that is used in Hercowitz and Sampson (1991).
Simply speaking, efficient leisure means husband and wife are able to attain the same utility
with less leisure time compared to previous period at a stable growth path because g is greater
than one. As stated in the specification, technological shocks change the labor supply for
both family members. This assumption captures the variation of hours worked in the real
economy. In addition, this assumption accommodates home production; The variable labor
supply of both family members can be caused by the technological shocks to home production
that changes the leisure time for family members.
6

The definition of average productivity mimics the pattern used in the standard RBC model by treating
the whole family as a single agent.
7
The similar utility form was used in Galindev (2009).
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Based on all assumptions, the representative family maximizes its utility in Equation 4.40
under its constraint in Equation 4.33. The maximal problem is expressed as follows,

max E0

∞
X
t=0

1−γw
Ct1−σ
Zt1−σ (Lht )1−γh
Zt1−σ (Lw
t )
b[
+ θh
+ θw
]
1−σ
1 − γh
1 − γw
t

Ct + Kt+1 = At Ktα Nt1−α + (1 − δ)Kt .

(4.41)

(4.42)

Since there is a determinant trend in growth, this paper detrends Equations 4.41 and
4.42 and lists the modified maximal problem as follows,

1−σ

max(X0 )

E0

∞
X
t=0

β t[

1−γw
c1−σ
A1−σ (Lht )1−γh
A1−σ (Lw
t
t )
+ θh t
+ θw t
]
1−σ
1 − γh
1 − γw

ct + gkt+1 = At ktα (Nth + Ntw )1−α − (1 − δ)kt ,

(4.43)

(4.44)

where β = bg 1−σ , and c, k, y, ay, i denote variables after detrending.
The following are first order conditions derived for the maximal problem,

c−σ
= λt
t

(4.45)

(1 − Nth )−γh = λt (1 − α)At ktα Nt−α
θh A1−σ
t

(4.46)

(1 − Ntw )−γw = λt (1 − α)At ktα Nt−α
θw A1−σ
t

(4.47)

gλt = βEt λt+1 [αAt ktα−1 Nt1−α + (1 − δ)],

(4.48)
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where λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Equation 4.44.
Equation 4.45 is the intertemporal substitution of consumption between two periods.
Equations 4.46 and 4.47 are intratemporal substitution between hours worked and consumption for husband and wife.
From Equations 4.46 and 4.47, we see that technological shocks also shift the aggregate
labor supply curve for husband and wife. The mechanism by which the efficient leisure works
can be shown by bringing the logarithm to Equation 4.46,

Nth ≈

log(wt ) + log(λt ) + (σ − 1)log(At ) − log(θh )
.
γh

(4.49)

From Equation 4.49, we see that the technological shocks change the labor supply of the
husband. The same happens to the wife if we apply the same procedure to Equation 4.47.
Therefore, technological shocks shift the labor supply curve by using the efficient leisure.

4.3.3

Model Calibration

The parameters used to simulate the artificial model are listed in Table 4.1. α is set
to 0.33 to match the capital output ratio. β, the subjective discount rate, is set to 0.988
to obtain a reasonable 1% interest rate per period at stable state (where a period is one
quarter). δ, the capital depreciation rate, is set to 0.025 to obtain about 8% capital output
ratio and about 23% investment output ratio. g is set to 1.005, which implies annual 2%
net growth rate. ρ is set to 0.979 and σe is set to 0.0072, which is approximate to the value
in Prescott (1986). For σ, there is no specific requirement except that scholars consider σ
be less than ten in financial literature. Therefore, σ is set to ten to maximize the impact
of technological shocks on labor supply according to Equation 4.49. For γh , γw , θh and θw ,
three of them would be free parameters if it is the case that we know γh and γw . The values
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of θh or θw are left to calibrate if the values of Nth and Ntw are pinned down at the steady state.

Table 4.1: Parameters for Calibration
Parameter

α

β

δ

ρ

σ

µ

σe

Value

0.33

0.985

0.025

0.975

10

1.005

0.0072

Table 4.2: Hours Worked of Family Members

Year

Mean Male

Mean Female

Ratio

1976

43.9

33.9

0.82

1977

44.55

33.91

0.81

1978

44.63

33.97

0.81

1979

44.75

34.25

0.81

1980

44.48

34.13

0.81

1981

43.95

33.92

0.83

1982

43.78

33.70

0.83

1983

43.54

33.89

0.84

1984

43.67

34.03

0.84

Historical hours worked for husbands and wives are presented to obtain the values of
Nth and Ntw at the steady state. Table 4.2 is calculated from March CPS of U.S.A from
1976 to 1985. The variable of CPS used to calculate is HRSWORK (hours worked last
week). Mean Male is the average hours worked of husbands, Mean Female is the average
hours worked of wives, and the ratio is the hours worked of wives over the hours worked of
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husbands in the same family. The time period is the only available data that can be used
to match the data listed in Table 1 in Hansen (1985). From the table, the husbands’ hours
worked have been stable since 1976 and the wives’ hours worked have been stable since 1976
too. We take the mean value of hours worked by husbands and wives across years as the
values of Nth and Ntw at the steady state. On average, husbands work 43.66 hours per week
and wives work 33.97 hours per week. According to Knowles (2012), 118 hours are available
for one person per week excluding sleeping and other necessary activities. Therefore, Nth is
0.37 and Ntw is 0.29 if we normalize the hours worked for husbands and wives. With these
two values, we free γh and γw to match the facts of labor market fluctuations.

4.3.4

Results and Comparison

Table 4.3: Standard Deviation and Correlations with Output
Series

Standard Deviation(%)

Correlation with Y

y

1.68 (1.7)

1.0 (1.0)

c

0.78 (1.29)

0.98 (0.85)

k

0.86 (0.63)

0.32 (0.04)

N

1.24 (1.66)

0.93 (0.76)

i

9.68 (8.60)

0.99 (0.92)

ay

0.7 (1.18)

0.74 (0.42)

U.S. Data is listed in the brace and attained from Hansen(1985)

The simulation is run by DYNARE at the first order approximation. The moments are
the mean values of fifty samples. Each sample is simulated for a period of 152 quarters.
The simulation date is calculated as the quarters from 1955q3 to 1984q1. HP filter applies

92
to each simulation to get the moments for each sample. Table 4.3 reports the moments of
variables after simulation. Compared with U.S historical data, the artificial model basically
achieves the reasonable moments of output, consumption, labor supply and capital.
More importantly, the artificial model successfully captures the relationship between aggregate hours worked (Nt ) and average productivity (ayt ). Table 4.4 reports the comparison
among different models. The standard RBC model fails to produce higher variation of aggregate hours worked, and small positive correlation between aggregate hours worked and
average productivity. The non-separable preferences model and the indivisible labor model
generate the higher ratio but they fail to generate the right correlation between aggregate
hours worked and average productivity. The government spending model, home production model, and family labor supply model with efficient leisure successfully capture the
relationship between aggregate hours worked and average productivity.
Table 4.4: Correlation and fluctuation Between N and ay
Models

corr(N, ay)

σN
σay

U.S Historical Data

0.44

1.64

Standard Model

0.93

0.94

Nonseparable Leisure

0.80

1.63

Indivisible Labor

0.76

2.63

Government Spending

0.49

0.90

Home Production

0.49

1.92

Family Labor Supply

0.46

1.78

U.S. data is available from Hansen and Wright (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
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4.4

Conclusion

This paper introduces family labor supply with efficient leisure into a standard RBC
frame to capture the relationship between aggregate hours worked and average productivity
in business cycles. The artificial model in this paper successfully attains the relationship
between aggregate hours worked and average productivity. The desirable results in this
paper have been attained with reasonable parameter setting, especially the comparative
lower labor supply elasticity. The labor supply elasticity for the model’s husband is 1.8
and the labor supply elasticity for the model’s wife is 2.6. Although these two values are
higher than values attained from micro panel data, the labor supply elasticity in family labor
supply model is as effective as other models. The labor supply elasticity is about 2.03 in
the standard RBC model, the government spending shocks model, and the home production
shocks model. The labor supply elasticity is approximate to infinity in the non-separable
leisure model and indivisible labor model. Thus, the family labor supply model with efficient
leisure is a viable alternative solution to the puzzle in the standard RBC model.
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